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THESIS

**STEMMING THE GROWTH: EXPLORING THE RISK
FACTORS IN GROUP MEMBERSHIP IN DOMESTIC
STREET GANGS AND FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS**

by

Daniel A. Dooley

September 2015

Thesis Advisor:

Fathali M. Moghaddam

Co-Advisor:

Patrick Miller

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ORGANIZATIONS**

Daniel A. Dooley
Commanding Officer of Manhattan South Vice and Major Case Narcotic Unit,
New York Police Department
B.S., John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 1996

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requirements for the degree of

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September 2015**

Approved by: Fathali M. Moghaddam, Ph.D.
Thesis Advisor

Chief Patrick Miller
Co-Advisor

Mohammed M. Hafez, Ph.D.
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

Despite law enforcement's best efforts, terrorist groups are expanding at alarming rates. One of the easiest ways to prevent terrorist attacks is to prevent individuals from joining terrorist organizations. Counter-terrorism programs that effectively reduce membership, reduce association and increase desistance to terror groups will undoubtedly reduce terror incidents. This research identifies risk factors that greatly influence an individual's decision to join a terrorist group; policy makers can use this information to design new policies aimed at prevention and intervention.

If the U.S. government is looking for community-oriented solutions to criminal groups, it need look no further than the study of domestic street gangs. There is vast research into theories, strategies and programs that policy makers can reference. Because these models already exist for street gangs, the government need not waste time developing new strategies from scratch. This research discovered the group dynamic and processes that exist for street gangs exists similarly for terrorist organizations. It is the hope that this research lends new direction to the developing policies and de-radicalization strategies that are currently underway.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

One way to avoid terrorist attacks is to prevent individuals from joining terrorist organizations in the first place. Yet, despite law enforcement's best efforts, people continue to join terrorist organizations at alarming rates. A new deterrence strategy is sorely needed.

In 2015, the U.S. government convened for a three-day summit at the White House to develop new strategies to counter violent extremism (CVE). Their goal was to coordinate local, state and federal stakeholders in countering behaviors that “radicalize, recruit and incite violence.”¹ But this was not the federal government's first attempt at a national CVE strategy. In 2011, the federal government released a CVE national strategy called “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.” It was a three-pronged approach that included “community engagement, better training and counter-narratives” to extremist ideologies.² The authors recognized that communities at a local level were best suited to combat violent extremism because they were better positioned to identify program clients.³ Therefore, the battle against violent extremism was to take a community-oriented approach.

If the U.S. government is looking for community-oriented solutions to deter criminal groups, they need look no further than the study of domestic street gangs. Gangs have been a focus of concern for many public officials, community service practitioners and researchers for decades. As such, the study has seen its share of theories that attempt to explain gang membership and offending and delinquent behavior. New CVE program developers may be able to use these same theories to help explain terrorists' behaviors.

¹ Office of the Press Secretary, “The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism,” The White House, February 18, 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism>.

² Dina Temple-Raston, “White House Unveils Counter-Extremism Plan,” NPR, August 3, 2011, <http://www.npr.org/2011/08/04/138955790/white-house-unveils-counter-extremism-plan>.

³ White House, *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (Washington, DC: White House, 2011).

Any prevention or intervention program's success starts with targeting appropriate program clients—in this case, terrorists or people on the path to radicalization. Any program that engages likely non-joiners can be very costly and highly ineffective.⁴ This type of program, therefore, requires some form of early identification and specific targeting of the risk factors that make one more likely to join a group. This research has honed in on four common characteristics that make individuals more likely to join both terrorist and street-gang organizations: identity deprivation, poverty, progression and peer pressure. It should be noted that most people who possess one or more of these risk factors still do not join street gangs or terrorist organizations.⁵ In fact, only a small percentage of people actually join these types of groups.⁶ Regardless, before a program can be developed, the at-risk population must be identified; while possessing one of these risk factors may be a good start, possessing multiple factors is much more predicative.⁷

Identity Deprivation

To resolve personal crises, people will often search for identity through a process called self-categorization, in which they seek out groups that have ideologies or characteristics with which they identify.⁸ A person seeking a new or different identity may then adopt an identity put forth by a group. Once a member of the group, the individual then assumes the ideology and behavior patterns the other group members. Once people become members of groups, however, they begin to compare themselves to the other members and hope they are faring better.⁹ If not, they may look to leave their group.

⁴ Malcom W. Klein and Cheryl L. Maxson, *Street Gang: Patterns and Policies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

⁵ Ibid., 105

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ “Frequently Asked Questions about Gangs,” National Gang Center, accessed January 25, 2015, <http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/about/FAQ#q2>.

⁸ Kevin Durrheim, “Introduction to Social Identity Posted by Henri Tajfel,” YouTube video, 11:35, posted by Henri Tajfel, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tf5_gWa3h2g (accessed July 18, 2015).

⁹ Ibid.

This group dynamic presents CVE program developers with an opportunity to prevent individuals from joining targeted groups, and possibly the opportunity to persuade them to leave; CVE program developers should focus on strategies that confer diminished self-esteem to terrorist groups.

Poverty

Poverty does not necessarily refer to economic status. It can refer to respect, love, education, or any number of perceived wealths. Professor Fathali Moghaddam writes, “Relative deprivation...is how individuals feel about their situation relative to particular others, how deprived they feel subjectively and in a comparative sense, rather than how they are doing according to objective criteria.”¹⁰ People may join terrorist organizations or street gangs if doing so helps secure resources, obtain desires, or accomplish goals

It is not possible to satisfy everyone’s needs. However, CVE program developers need to fashion socially acceptable ways for people to reasonably obtain those things street gangs and terrorist organizations provide for their members.

Progression

Terrorists are not born; they are made.¹¹ This progression can happen rapidly or occur over the course of several years. Failed neo-liberal policies, poor governance, political instability and economic recessions have caused Middle Eastern youths to become stuck in a period of limbo for protracted periods of time.¹² Some have joined terrorist organizations and/or street gangs because the group provided the only opportunity for the individual to exit this stalled state and progress.¹³

¹⁰ Fathali Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” *American Psychologist* 60, no. 2 (2005): 162–163.

¹¹ Anne C. Speckhard. *Talking to Terrorists* (McLean, VA: Advances Press, 2012), 15909.

¹² Alcinda Honwana, “‘Waithood’: Youth Transitions and Social Change,” in *Development and Equity*, eds. Dick Foeken, Leo de Haan, and Linda Johnson, 28–40 (Social Sciences E-Books Online, 2014), doi 10.1163/9789004269729_004.

¹³ Mohamed Ali, “The Link between Unemployment and Terrorism,” speech, September 2013, http://www.ted.com/talks/mohamed_ali_the_link_between_unemployment_and_terrorism/transcript?language=en#t-19391 (accessed July 1, 2015).

Moghaddam used the metaphor of a staircase to describe this progression. He explains that the majority of people begin on the ground floor, where they feel frustrated and deprived of material resources.¹⁴ In an effort to better their situation, they ascend to the next floor. Each successive floor comes with more exposure to radicalized ideology and behavior. Eventually, a small few wind up on the top floor, which leads to an act of terror.¹⁵

CVE program developers need to create strategies that engage this youthful population. Job training, placement and entrepreneurship education may help stymie this state of limbo. Coordination and input from the private businesses in communities is integral to a successful strategy.

Peer Pressure

Peer influence is the most consistent predictor of group membership.¹⁶ An individual's behavior is overwhelmingly influenced by personal connections.¹⁷ If one family member is part of a group, for example, there is a greater probability that other family members will join.¹⁸ A study by the National Gang Crime Research Center found most gang members already had family members in the gang prior to joining.¹⁹ Peer pressure exerted by an individual or group encourages others to change their attitudes, values or behavior to conform to the groups'.²⁰ Once a terrorist and/or street gang member is identified, program managers should look to their peer networks for other potential program clients.

¹⁴ Moghaddam, "The Staircase to Terrorism," 163.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Klein and Maxson. *Street Gang*.

¹⁷ Donelson R. Forsyth, *Group Dynamics*, 5th Edition (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Cengage Learning, 2010), 137.

¹⁸ Keren Brooking, Ben Gardiner, and Sarah Calvert, *Background of Students in Alternative Education: Interviews with a Selected 2008 Cohort* (Research, New Zealand: Ministry of Education, 2009).

¹⁹ Amanda Vogt, "Gangs: A Cry For Family?" *Chicago Tribune*. December 24, 1996. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-12-24/features/9612240065_1_gang-members-kids-probation-officer (accessed July 15, 2015).

²⁰ "Peer Pressure," [faqs.org](http://www.faqs.org/health/topics/76/Peer-pressure.html), accessed July 13, 2015, <http://www.faqs.org/health/topics/76/Peer-pressure.html>.

Conclusions

The material covered in this research illustrates the similarities between street gang members and terrorists. If nothing else, it reminds us that these people still belong to groups. Prevention and intervention programs will fare better if they are fashioned from what we know about group processes.

There is a long academic history in the study of gangs. That accumulated knowledge coupled with the experiences in successful and failed intervention programs should be a solid starting point for upcoming CVE strategies. There is no need to develop brand new models and spend years of research before developing a program. Past gang research should suffice. Gang theories, models and programs may not explicitly tell us what to do but, rather may guide us away from what not to do.

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To my sons, Justin and Jason: Everything I do, I do for you. I challenged myself and took on all this work to impress upon you the importance of school. Learning never stops...never. I hope this experience will forever serve as a reminder for you. Set your goals high—extremely high—and then claw your way to the finish line.

Finally, to my Dad, Edward Dooley, who died as my plane touched down in NYC returning from IR 6. You have always been, and you will always be, my role model of hard work. Till the day you died, you got up every morning, put on your pants and went to work. Even though we all know you didn't have to. I know you're up in heaven looking down and saying, "Measure twice, cut once." I'm proud of you and I miss you.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Despite law enforcement's best efforts, people continue to join terrorist organizations at alarming rates. One way to avoid terrorist attacks is to prevent individuals from joining terrorist organizations in the first place. A solution may lie in the study of street gangs, which recruit and retain members similarly to terrorist groups. This study asks: Are the individual characteristics and social conditions influencing individuals to join domestic street gangs the same as those for foreign terrorist organizations?

Since September 11, 2001, people have debated if foreign terrorist organizations are similar to domestic street gangs. The controversy stems from researchers' reluctance—namely criminologists who study street gangs, and terrorist analysts who study terrorist organizations—to accept these similarities, opting, instead, to exaggerate the differences.

Criminologists believe terrorists' political and/or religious motivations distinguish them from gang members—even though some terrorists may fit neatly into the social theories and models developed for gangs. Meanwhile, some terrorist analysts believe street gangs are only motivated by personal gain (e.g., money); politics or religion play no role in the making of a street gangster, in this view. Some terrorists, however, have been known to commit crimes merely to support their political and/or religious agendas. Likewise, street gangs exist for a variety of motivations. Yet these differences do not preclude them from being identified as a street gang.

The Department of Homeland Security, along with federal, state and local governments, is currently in the midst of developing counter-terrorism programs and intervention policies. The goal of this research is to identify specific factors that cause individuals to join violent groups; homeland security programs can then use this information to model programs that deter terrorist organization membership. Whichever characteristics street gangs and terrorist groups may or may not share, both groups recruit and accept members to carry out illegal acts that often involve violence. This observation

is the starting point for this research, which explores individual characteristics and social conditions that encourage individuals to join domestic street gangs, and seeks to determine if they are the same for terrorist organizations.

A. LITERATURE REVIEW

Martin Sanchez-Jankowski, in his article “Gangs and the Structure of U.S. Society,” acknowledged there is a tremendous amount of research conducted into the growth of street gangs.²¹ Yet, despite this abundant research, the study of gangs can be broken down into only two categories: the first describes gangs based upon their behavior and the crimes they commit, and second analyzes the individual characteristics that may influence a person to join a gang.²² This research focuses on the latter category and, specifically, the individual and societal characteristics of identity, poverty, progression and peer influence.²³

There is no shortage in the study of domestic street gangs, especially by criminologists. Criminology is defined as the “scientific study of the nature, control, punishment and prevention of criminal behavior by individuals.”²⁴ It includes many different disciplines, such as sociology, behavioral psychology and law. In addition, criminology explores the many physical and psychological characteristics of criminals in an effort to design control strategies for law enforcement.²⁵ Yet, one group of criminals is having a hard time getting criminologists’ attention: terrorists.

Since the tragic events of 9/11, there has been a surprising lack of criminology research into terrorism. After a review of the literature, most criminologists suggest that, although terrorists commit crimes, they do not fit neatly into the “criminal” category; researchers allude to differences in ideology, motivation and violence as the main

²¹ Martin Sanchez-Jankowski, “Gangs and the Structure of U.S. Society,” University of California, Berkeley, <http://publicsociology.berkeley.edu/publications/producing/sanchez.pdf>.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Anthony Walsh and Lee Ellis, *Criminology: An Interdisciplinary Approach* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.2007), 1–3.

²⁵ Ric Curtis, “What is Criminology?” *John Jay College of Criminal Justice Online*, accessed January 3, 2015, http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/departments/sociology/about_criminology.php.

dissimilarities. Smith, Rush and Burton state the difference quite simply: street gangs commit crime for money while terrorist organizations seek to advance a political or religious agenda.²⁶ This does not imply, however, that all gangs and all terrorist organizations are centered on those ideas. For the remainder of this research, any conclusions are only suggested to apply to some street gang members and some terrorists; nothing in this research is meant to imply “all street gang members” or “all terrorists.”

Political agendas are not exclusive to terrorist groups; some gangs have involved themselves in politics. In October 1993, the Almighty Conservative Vice Lords, a local Chicago street gang, took to the streets not to commit crime, but to register new voters for an upcoming political election.²⁷ They even went as far as conducting voter education classes, and marching in protests about healthcare and school system reform.²⁸ None of these actions are criminal, and could be seen as political. Some literature suggests gangs only engage in politics to further their criminal enterprise. They accomplish this by infiltrating and corrupting existing governmental systems.²⁹ Over the last ten years, some Chicago politicians have allegedly received illegal bribes from local street gangs in exchange for jobs, tip offs to law enforcement operations and other favors.³⁰ Reasons aside, street gangs have engaged in politics.

The moralistic nature of crime has also been used to show differences between gang members and terrorists. Prominent criminologist Donald Black believed labeling terrorism as a crime ignores its moralistic character and “is the surest way to obscure its

²⁶ Carter Smith, Jeff Rush, and Catherine Burton, “Street Gangs, Organized Crime Groups, and Terrorist: Differentiating Criminal Organizations,” *Investigative Sciences Journal Online*, January 2013, www.investigativesciencesjournal.org/article/download/11431/7717 (accessed January 3, 2015), 4–7.

²⁷ George Papajohn, “Gang Peace Summit: A Plaque on All Their Houses,” *Chicago Tribune*, October 26, 1993, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1993-10-26/news/9310260179_1_gang-peace-summit-wallace-gator-bradley-assassination-attempt.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Smith, Rush, and Burton. “Street Gangs, Organized Crime Groups, and Terrorist.”

³⁰ David Bernstein and Noah Isackson, “Gangs and Politicians in Chicago: An Unholy Alliance,” *Chicago Magazine*, December 13, 2011, <http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/January-2012/Gangs-and-Politicians-An-Unholy-Alliance/> (accessed January 23, 2015).

sociological identity and obstruct its scientific understanding.”³¹ The perpetrators of crimes such as robbery, rape and burglary do not believe they have a moral obligation to commit such crimes. Some terrorists, on the other hand, do.³² Professor Richard Rosenfeld supports this claim:

Terrorism is moralistic or justice-oriented violence accomplished by predatory means. The genesis of terrorist violence lies within a particular configuration of social institutions at odds with the institutional triumvirate of modern society: free markets, liberal democracy, and religious tolerance. Terrorism represents a grievance against modernity.³³

Some terrorists believe the use of violence is moral, and necessary in the fight against modernity. Yet Nathanson has stated actions can be morally wrong even if the intended goals are generally valuable.³⁴ In this line of thought, the ends do not justify the means.

The etiology of criminal behavior notwithstanding, street gangs and terrorist organizations both commit crime in varying degrees and spaces. There are no crimes one can commit that would not make one a criminal. Criminologists study criminals. Therefore, criminologists should study terrorism.

A third, and perhaps biggest, contention that appears in the literature is violence. Throughout the literature review, it was clear that just about every author had to wrestle with descriptions of violence associated with terrorism. The magnitude of violence referenced in ordinary crime, such as robbery, rape and burglary, pales in comparison to recent acts of terrorism. 9/11 is just one example. Donald Black believed the level of violence employed during 9/11 was of such an enormous magnitude that it could not be characteristic of ordinary criminal violence.³⁵ Therefore, he argues, it cannot be studied

³¹ For more information see: Donald Black, “Terrorism as Social Control,” in *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Criminological Perspectives*, ed. Mathieu Deflem, 9–18 (New York: Elsevier, 2004), 12.

³² Samuel Scheffler. “Is Terrorism Morally Distinctive?” *Journal of Political Philosophy* 14, no. 1 (April 2006): 1–17.

³³ Richard Rosenfeld, “Terrorism and Criminology,” in *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Criminological Perspectives*, ed. Mathieu Deflem, 19–32 (New York: Elsevier, 2004).

³⁴ Stephen Nathanson, *Terrorism and the Ethics of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

³⁵ Black, “Terrorism as Social Control,” 9.

by criminologists. Instead, Black believes terrorism is a form of quasi-warfare because it attacks civilians in addition to military targets. He uses the word “warfare” because the level of violence corresponds more to the mass killings akin to war than to crime.³⁶ On the other hand, Richard Rosenfeld states, “Black calls it ‘quasi-warfare,’ but a more precise term is ‘criminal-warfare.’ Terrorism is the nexus of warlike aims and criminal (i.e., predatory) means.”³⁷ This makes terrorism not only a military problem, as Black would suggest, but a criminal justice problem as well.

The U.S. criminal justice system is already engaged in the fight against terrorism.³⁸ The United States Department of Justice boasts that they have already done a successful job incapacitating terrorists and gathering intelligence.³⁹ So, the differing level of violence has not stopped the criminal justice system from actively engaging in counter-terrorism efforts and arresting terrorist for criminal offenses.

While criminologists and terrorist analysts seem unable to operate on the same playing field, terrorist organizations and street gangs have been cooperating with each other throughout the years. Craig Collins contends, “There has always been a concern amongst law enforcement that someone or organization with an electrifying charisma would show up and unite all these gangs into one big criminal enterprise or devious cause.”⁴⁰ Law enforcement agencies have long feared international terrorist organizations may develop alliances with U.S. street gangs.⁴¹ Their fear may stem from the documented history of domestic terrorist organizations working with some urban street gangs to commit acts of terror.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Rosenfeld, “Terrorism and Criminology.”

³⁸ Brent L. Smith, *Terrorism in America* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).

³⁹ “The Criminal Justice System as a Counter-Terrorism Tool,” United States Department of Justice, accessed January 23, 2015, <http://www.justice.gov/cjs>.

⁴⁰ Craig Collins, *Street Gangs: Profiles for the Police* (New York City: Copp Organization, 1979).

⁴¹ David G. Curry, “Gangs, Crime and Terrorism,” in *Criminologists on Terrorism and Homeland Security*, ed. Brian Frost, Jack R Greene, and James Lynch (New York City: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 97–112.

For example, in the early 1970s, the Black Liberation Army (BLA), a militant extremist organization who vehemently hated law enforcement, solicited the Black Spades—New York City’s largest street gang at the time—to murder police officers.⁴² According to the Fraternal Order of Police, the BLA was already responsible for the deaths of 13 police officers countrywide.⁴³ Because of increased law enforcement scrutiny, the BLA reckoned it would be easier for a street gang with less law enforcement attention to accomplish their goals. So they recruited the Black Spades. The Black Spades agreed to the conspiracy and the BLA supplied the weapons to carry out the plot. Luckily law enforcement thwarted the scheme before anyone was murdered.

Perhaps a better-known alliance—this time to commit an act of terror—was between Chicago’s feared El Rukn street gang and the government of Libya in the 1980s. The El Rukns, because of their hunger for money and power, were easily susceptible to recruitment efforts by the Libyan government.⁴⁴ In 1986, the El Rukns agreed to bomb U.S. governmental buildings for the Libyan government in return for cash and sanctuary in Libya. Through a series of El Rukns’ missteps, however, the plot was quickly thwarted and several prominent gang members were arrested.

Since 9/11, more and more attention has focused on the potential alliances between street gangs and terrorist organizations. It was a major topic at the Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. In their report, published in April of 2005, the Congress outlined several characteristics of established criminal networks like street gangs that would make them attractive partners to terrorist organizations.⁴⁵ Likewise, terrorist organizations seek networks such as gangs because

⁴² Collins, *Street Gangs: Profiles for the Police*.

⁴³ “History of the Black Liberation Army.” Moorbey’s Blog, March 20, 2013, <https://moorbey.wordpress.com/2013/03/20/history-of-the-black-liberation-army>.

⁴⁴ Maurice Possley and William B Crawford Jr., “El Rukns indicted in Libya Scheme,” *Chicago Tribune*, October 31, 1986, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1986-10-31/news/8603210871_1_el-rukns-black-p-stone-nation-street-gang.

⁴⁵ United Nations, “International Cooperation Against Terrorism and Other Criminal Activities in the Context of the Work of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,” conference summary, Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Bangkok, 2005.

they have an ability to move money and share information, and are knowledgeable about government systems, including law enforcement operations.⁴⁶

Some criminologists, such as G. David Curry, have refuted such alliances, claiming the relationships are much too complex. Criminal organizations exist to make money, he says.⁴⁷ They depend on going undetected from law enforcement. Terrorist organizations, especially after 9/11, bring with them a huge amount of law enforcement attention, which would not be beneficial to a gang.⁴⁸ Yet, despite Curry's contentions, some street gangs have already cooperated with terror organizations.

Whether one chooses to believe terrorist organizations and street gangs are similar or dissimilar, based upon criminologists' arguments associated with motivation, ideology or violence are irrelevant to this research. It is also irrelevant to discount or accept their associations throughout the years to commit acts of terror. What is important to this research is that both groups, as demonstrated by the readings, recruit, attract, solicit and accept the membership of individuals.⁴⁹ The primary focus of this research is to identify the specific individual characteristics and social conditions that influence a person to join a street gang and/or terrorist organization. Comparing and juxtaposing these two groups helps determine if these individual characteristics and social conditions are endemic to one particular group or are if they universal.

When studying deviant groups, there is a considerable amount of research dedicated to street gangs. The earliest research was conducted by Dr. Frederic Thrasher in his seminal work, *The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago* in 1927. Dr. Thrasher studied 1920s Chicago street gangs from a sociological perspective, in which he examined individual characteristics such as poverty and environmental factors.⁵⁰ Dr. Thrasher's work was considered so groundbreaking and foundational that much of his

⁴⁶ United Nations, "International Cooperation Against Terrorism."

⁴⁷ Curry, "Gangs, Crime and Terrorism," 101.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Smith, Rush and Burton, "Street Gangs, Organized Crime Groups, and Terrorist."

⁵⁰ Frederic Thrasher, *The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927).

work still influences researchers today.⁵¹ This influence has led future researchers to analyze and expand the individual characteristics. Though the attributes are by no means comprehensive, they are heavily researched and common amongst many authors. It is widely agreed that multiple risk factors working in combination, rather than any characteristic alone, better predicts group membership.⁵² The National Gang Center sums up this point:

Risk factors are variables increase the likelihood of the outcome in question—in this case, gang membership. Gang research scholars have discovered a multitude of risk factors that are statistically linked to gang joining. These individual risk factors span the many dimensions in a youth's life and are typically grouped into five categories (called "domains"): individual, family, school, peer, and neighborhood/community. Importantly, however, these extensive research studies have demonstrated that there is no one risk factor (or even domain) responsible for gang joining; rather, it is the accumulation of multiple risk factors across multiple domains that greatly increases gang joining. Thus, put another way, gang joining is not reducible to a single risk factor (e.g., single-parent household), since some youth with the risk factor may not join a gang, and some youth without the risk factor may join. It is far more profitable, then, to assess (and ultimately address) the collection of risk factors across the five social domains to prevent gang joining.⁵³

One purpose of this research is to determine if foreign terrorist organizations are similar to domestic street gangs. Its aim is to identify specific risk factors that may influence an individual to join one of these the two groups. These risk factors are not prerequisites, but may merely increase a person's likelihood to join a group. According to a review of the literature, most people do not join street gangs and/or terrorist organizations unless they possess one or more of these risk factors.⁵⁴ Nonetheless, the selected characteristics (identity deprivation, poverty, progression and peer influence) are frequently examined and common in research to both groups.

⁵¹ Richard K. Moule Jr., *Moving Towards a Quantitative Understanding of Thrasher's Threat-Cohesion Hypothesis*, master's thesis, Arizona State University, 2011.

⁵² "Frequently Asked Questions about Gangs," National Gang Center, accessed January 25, 2015m <http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/about/FAQ#q2>.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Malcom W. Klein and Cheryl L Maxson, *Street Gang: Patterns and Policies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

B. METHODOLOGY

The purpose this research is to identify specific risk factors that promote membership into gangs and terrorist organization. By discovering these key risk factors, law enforcement can develop policies for intervention and prevention based on solid research.

There is vast assortment of domestic street gangs and foreign terrorist organizations. To narrow down this data set, this research used biographies of gang members and terrorists that have political and ethno-centric components, such as MS-13, Crips, Hezbollah and Hamas. Because of these groups' popularity, there was sufficient data for a thorough review.

There are many characteristics individuals may possess that could increase their likelihood to join a deviant group. This research was bound by exploring individual characteristics such as poverty, identity deprivation, progression and peer influence. These characteristics have been chosen because of their frequency in existing research. Examining each characteristic's influence on both groups helps determine if it is endemic to one group or more universal.

There were several limitations to this research. First, it was not the purpose of this research to decide which group is more dangerous to the American people. Second, this research presumably falls short of determining why the majority of the people who possess these risk factors fail to join a street gang and/or terrorist organization. Whereas this research may briefly touch upon these topics it not the purpose to answer these questions but perhaps provide a starting point for future inquiry.

The data was derived from first and secondhand biographies written about gang members and terrorists. For example, Raymond Washington was the founder of the modern-day street gang named the Crips. There have been numerous biographies written about him and his ascension into the gang. More importantly, the biographies provide data on Washington's individual evaluative characteristics. The biographies uncover if his socioeconomic status (i.e., poverty) played a role in his decision to start a street gang. Similar books written about terrorists by Anne Speckhard and Fathali Moghaddam were

also used. Both authors gave detailed accounts on the pedigrees of known terrorists. Such information was crucial in determining if these individuals possess the characteristics researched.

The data also came from research and surveys produced by criminologists, sociologists, psychologists and terrorist analysts into the characteristics and social conditions of members of these groups. Criminologists Malcolm Klein and Cheryl Maxson co-authored a book titled *Street Gangs: Patterns and Policies* in which they analyzed surveys conducted by criminologist between the years 1985 and 2001.⁵⁵ The results of their surveys were compared to the results of the research and used to support or refute some conclusions.

The conclusion of this research identifies specific risk factors which may influence an individual to join a domestic street gang and/or terrorist organization. These risk factors are not endemic to one specific group. Law enforcement can design policies and prevention programs that effectively serve both groups.

C. WHY GANGS, AND WHY NOW?

In February 2015, the U.S. federal government convened at a three-day summit on countering violent extremism (CVE). Their goal was to develop policies and strategies to deal with the threats posed by foreign and domestic terrorists. The summit brought together local, federal and international leaders to discuss “concrete steps the United States and its partners can take to develop community-oriented approaches to counter hateful extremist ideologies that radicalize, recruit and incite violence.”⁵⁶ But this was not the U.S. government’s first attempt at such strategy.

In 2011, the U.S. government released its first-ever national CVE strategy, called “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.” According to this strategy, solutions to violent extremism are best developed at the local

⁵⁵ Klein and Maxson, *Street Gang: Patterns and Policies*.

⁵⁶ Office of the Press Secretary, “The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism.”

level.⁵⁷ Local communities and governments are better equipped to design prevention and intervention programs tailored for their communities to target those most in need. Many of these communities already have outreach and community-policing mechanisms in place.⁵⁸ Therefore, the federal government believed its role was to act as a local-program facilitator rather than a program manager. In addition to the multitude of new measures this created, the U.S. government planned to:

- engage with local partners and strengthen community ties
- develop a prevention and intervention program framework
- award \$3.5 million dollars to the National Institute of Justice to conduct research on the topic (in addition to the \$15 million dollars given to the Department of Justice to build community resiliency)⁵⁹

Horrendous acts of terrorism and the fear and social disorder they create have often been used to justify the large expenditure of public funds. This indiscriminate violence has been the rationale behind many control policies and prevention programs. The success of any prevention and/or intervention program, however, starts with targeting appropriate program clients—in this case, terrorists or people on the path to radicalization. Any program that engages likely non-joiners can be very costly and highly ineffective. Therefore, these types of programs require some form of early identification and specific targeting of risk factors that make one more likely to radicalize or join a terrorist group. It would also make little sense to develop community-oriented programs that have proven ineffective in the past. To help avoid this pitfall, we turn to the study of gangs.

D. DOMESTIC STREET GANGS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR BETTER-DESIGNED CVE PROGRAMS

If the U.S. government is looking for community-oriented solutions to criminal groups, they need look no further than the study of domestic street gangs. Gangs have

⁵⁷ White House, “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States,” Domestic Preparedness, Washington, DC, 2011.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

been the focus of concern for public officials, community service practitioners and researchers for decades. Gang research has a long, rigorous academic history, dating back to the 1920s with the work of Dr. Frederic Thrasher. As such, many theories have attempted to explain gang membership and offending and delinquent behavior, including cultural diffusion, differential association, social disorganization and strain theory. CVE program developers may be able to use these theories to explain the behavior of terrorists as well.

Many terrorism theories being used today, such as relative deprivation and social identity theory, seem to expand upon gang theories. But the ability to utilize the same theories to explain both gangs and terrorist groups should not be the only reason to examine this correlation. Gangs have a more global impact than previously thought. Understanding street gangs in a global context is crucial in the development of public policy.⁶⁰ Those policies should be designed to reduce membership in these groups and the violence they cause.⁶¹ To that end, Hagedorn offered six points that support the importance of gang study, four of which are relevant to this thesis:

- Gangs thrive in urban areas. As more and more locations urbanize, there will be an increase in gangs.
- As global economies fail or recede, there will be a shrinking of state-sponsored social welfare. Gangs can provide for these community residents with the proceeds of their crime.
- People are banning together to resist marginalization. Some people have joined gangs as a way of protection against discrimination.
- Some gangs persist and are staples in many communities. As such, they play a major role in those communities' economic, social and political institutions.⁶²

There are decades of tried and failed community-oriented policies designed to reduce gang membership that could serve as a foundation for terrorism research. Those policies may not provide a successful way forward, but they may demonstrate merely

⁶⁰ John M. Hagedorn, "The Global Impact of Gangs," *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 21, no. 2 (May 2005): 153–169, doi: 10.1177/1043986204273390.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

what not to do. For example, after 9/11, mass media campaigns were undertaken across the United States to increase citizens' awareness of terrorism. Campaigns such as "See Something, Say Something" have been highly successful in increasing citizen awareness, but are extremely costly; it is estimated that NYNJ Port Authority spends \$2 to \$3 million dollars a year to maintain the program.⁶³ But such awareness may have unintended consequences, as seen with street gangs.

Old studies of crime attributed to street gangs focused on measuring the level of fear community members had about becoming victims of gang violence.⁶⁴ Objective levels of crime did not necessarily correlate with peoples' levels of fear.⁶⁵ A study of five impoverished neighborhoods in San Bernardino, California found that residents' fear of gangs increased when their awareness of gang activity increased.⁶⁶ Similar studies in Orange County, California were conducted, this time focusing on the correlation between the deterioration of the neighborhood and gang crime. The study found that peoples' fear of gangs increased when they felt their community was in decline.⁶⁷ Katz, Webb and Armstrong write:

Fear of gangs is not simply a consequence of, or in direct relation to, an objective threat....fear of gangs was unrelated to living in a high-gang area, an area in which we know that gang membership is high and in which we presume that gang crime is also high.⁶⁸

The Orange County study suggests that the government's program to increase community residents' awareness of gangs had an unintended consequence of overinflating their fear of victimization.⁶⁹ If officials wish to make community residents

⁶³ Manny Fernandez, "A Phrase for Safety After 9/11 Goes Global," *New York Times*, May 19, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/>.

⁶⁴ Klein and Maxson, *Street Gang: Patterns and Policies*, 84.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 85.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Charles M. Katz, Vincent J. Webb, and Todd A. Armstrong, "Fear of Gangs: A Test of Alternative Theoretical Models," *Justice Quarterly* 20, no. 1 (2003): 95–130, doi 10.1080/07418820300095471.

⁶⁹ Klein and Maxson. *Street Gang: Patterns and Policies*, 85.

feel safer, they should design public policy to strengthen and build community cohesion.⁷⁰

Fast forward to 2010, and the “See Something, Say Something” campaign to combat terrorism received similar reviews.⁷¹ Some believe the slogan does nothing more than raise fear and paranoia in an otherwise safe environment.⁷² Had the program designers looked to the San Bernardino and Orange County studies first, they could have avoided the same pitfall.

Better-designed CVE programs will effectively reduce membership, reduce association and increase desistance to terrorist groups. Policies that reduce membership will reduce terror incidents. Furthermore, policies based on good research and proven risk factors will more effectively prevent group membership. Therefore, research needs to be undertaken to identify those risk factors that greatly influence an individual to join a terrorist group. Careful attention should also be made to discover which risk factors have a greater chance of being manipulated by prevention and intervention efforts.

Since 9/11, much information about terrorism has been brought to the public eye through great authors such as Bruce Hoffman, David Brannan, Anders Strindberg and Fathali Moghaddam. It is the hope that this research will lend new direction to the developing CVE policies and de-radicalization strategies that are currently underway.

E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

The second chapter in this thesis explores identity, and the individual’s struggle with obtaining a desirable identity, which often leads to violent organization membership. The third chapter discusses poverty, and explains why a person may join a terrorist group or street gang if membership helps eliminate the frustration of impoverishment. The chapter also explains the role of failing social institutions and the advantages violent

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Fernandez, “A Phrase for Safety.”

⁷² Ibid.

organizations provide their members.⁷³ Chapter IV engages the topic of progression, which can explain a person's ascension to commit an act of terror or become a gang leader. Chapter V discusses the effect of peer pressure on criminal behavior. Chapter VI summarizes the main implications, looking to the policies and strategies developed for street gangs to determine if they are a viable model for future CVE programs. The thesis concludes in the final chapter that terrorists possess similar characteristics to street gang members. As such, the policies, programs and models developed for street gangs over the last century should provide CVE policy makers with ample ground on which to develop future policies and practices. The research finishes off with some practical policy suggestions.

⁷³ Martin Sanchez-Jankowski, "Gangs and Social Change," *Theoretical Criminology* 7, no. 2 (May 2003): 201.

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II. IDENTITY DEPRIVATION

Identity is an important ingredient in a person's personality.⁷⁴ It is the compilation of characteristics belonging to a specific individual that defines and sets him or her apart from others.⁷⁵ Identity tells each of us what kind of person we are in relation to others and in relation to other groups.⁷⁶ In a broader sense, identity can derive from a person's nationality, ethnicity, or religion, and can refer to someone's values, ethos or compassion.⁷⁷ Identity is not, however, merely how we see ourselves; it is how others see us as well.⁷⁸ An identity crisis arises when a person has trouble developing an identity with which he or she is comfortable.⁷⁹

This chapter sets out to determine if identity can be considered a common characteristic that causes individuals to join their respective groups. It concludes that identity issues exist similarly between street gang members and terrorists, despite the vast differences between both groups.

A. ERICK ERIKSON'S STAGES OF IDENTITY

One of the most influential psychoanalysts on identity was Erik Erikson.⁸⁰ He studied in the field of developmental psychology, which explains how people mentally develop throughout their lives.⁸¹ Erikson believed a person's identity develops from their

⁷⁴ James D. Fearon, *What Is Identity (As We Now Use the Word)?* Stanford: Stanford University, 1999), 7.

⁷⁵ David Brannan, Kristin Darken, and Anders Strindberg, *A Practitioner's Way Forward: Terrorism Analysis* (Salinas, CA: Agile Press, 2014), 66.

⁷⁶ Fearon, *What Is Identity*, 3–5; Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg. *A Practitioner's Way Forward*, 66.

⁷⁷ Fearon, *What Is Identity*, 1–6.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 9.

⁸⁰ "About Erikson," Erikson Institute, accessed July 19, 2015, <http://www.erikson.edu/about/history/erik-erikson/>.

⁸¹ "Erik Erikson 8 Stages of Psychosocial Development," YouTube video, presented by Rory Lees-Oakes, 12:12, posted by "CounsellingResource," October 14, 2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=577GqQDMX08> (accessed July 15, 2015).

learned interaction with others.⁸² According to Erikson, identity is not static; it changes and evolves over time as we learn from the teachings and values of our parent(s), and then as we are exposed to different people and environments.⁸³

Erikson postulated identity develops along the path of eight predetermined stages, in which individuals are faced with conflicts to resolve before progressing to the next stage.⁸⁴ These conflicts typically stem from a person's interactions with others.⁸⁵ Through the resolution of these conflicts, the person obtains attributes or virtues that contribute to the development of identity.⁸⁶ Once a person obtains enough attributes, he or she can function as a successful adult—a person who can be intimate with others and share his or her life while still retaining a distinct identity.⁸⁷ When a person fails to resolve a conflict, his or her development stalls. This was Erikson's idea of an identity crisis, which typically occurs around the time a person attempts to answer questions like: What kind of person am I? What is my place in society? What is my role?⁸⁸ Answers are sought through interaction with others.⁸⁹ If the interactions are successful, the individual begins to build relationships; if they are not, the individual falls into a period of "role confusion."⁹⁰

Role confusion occurs when a person feels lost, unsure of what kind of person he or she is, or of where he or she belongs in society.⁹¹ Erikson explains this further in his fifth stage of development: "identity achievement versus role confusion."⁹² Arguably Erikson's most important stage of development, identity achievement versus role

⁸² Matt Tolbert, "Erik Erikson's Identity Crisis: Who Am I?" YouTube video, 7:34, 2014, posted by "Simply Psych," <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=He7CrBLn-RE> (accessed July 15, 2015).

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ "Erik Erikson 8 Stages of Psychosocial Development," YouTube video.

⁸⁵ Tolbert, YouTube Video.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ "Erik Erikson 8 Stages of Psychosocial Development," YouTube video; Tolbert, YouTube video.

⁸⁸ Tolbert, YouTube Video; "Erik Erikson 8 Stages of Psychosocial Development," YouTube video.

⁸⁹ Tolbert, YouTube video.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

confusion usually occurs at the onset of adolescence.⁹³ It is a time when a person begins to learn the different roles he or she plays in life—sibling, student, boyfriend, etc. Whatever the role and regardless how many, the person needs to successfully integrate them all into one constant role.⁹⁴ Gross writes:

What is unique about this stage of identity is that it is a special sort of synthesis of earlier stages and a special sort or anticipation of later ones. Youth has a certain unique quality in a person's life; it is a bridge between childhood and adulthood. Youth is a time of radical change- the great body changes accompanying puberty, the ability of the mind to search one's own intentions and the intentions of others, the suddenly sharpened awareness of the roles society has offered for later life.⁹⁵

People at this stage are trying to establish who they are as individuals and who they are in relation to the community around them.⁹⁶ This can be a challenging time for those who are not comfortable with their self-identified roles, or the roles society has envisioned for them.⁹⁷ If a person does not successfully progress through this stage, they cannot move on to the next stage, which is intimacy.⁹⁸ An identity crisis results.⁹⁹ For this research, we consider: Are terrorists asking themselves, “what kind of person am I?”

B. NATIONALITY'S ROLE IN IDENTITY

In Anne Speckhard's book *Talking to Terrorists*, she conducts one-on-one interviews with people progressing along paths of radicalization to terrorism. She interviewed a young teenager named Jamal who was slowly becoming radicalized against his home country of Belgium.¹⁰⁰ Jamal, a Muslim of Moroccan decent, faced increased discrimination by the majority population in Belgium, which consists largely of white

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Gross, *Introducing Erik Erikson*, 39.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ “Erik Erikson 8 Stages of Psychosocial Development,” YouTube video.

⁹⁸ Gross, *Introducing Erik Erikson*, 39.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Speckhard, *Talking to Terrorists*, 12376.

Christian Europeans.¹⁰¹ Nationality is a major characteristic in developing one's identity; the symbolic value alone from nationality-derived identity is sufficient reason for some people to go to war.¹⁰² The inability to subscribe to a nationality may cause an identity crisis. When Speckhard asked Jamal which nationality he considered himself, he responded,

I am Belgian. I was born here. I have both Belgian and Moroccan passports. But in Morocco people say "Go away Belgian guy" Here (Belgium) they tell me "Go away Moroccan! We lack identity."¹⁰³

The discrimination from the majority population of both Belgium and Morocco caused an identity crisis for Jamal. He was unable to identify as a Belgian because of his Moroccan descent, but he could also not identify with the people of Morocco either, because he was born in Belgium. In an effort to resolve this conflict, Jamal sought a group to which he could belong. Unfortunately, he found such resolution in a terrorist organization. The terrorist group became his foundational identity.

Jamal's experience is similar to that of immigrants who join gangs. The United States is a country of immigrants, made up of people from all over the world who have had to overcome prejudice and discrimination by the citizens of their new country.¹⁰⁴ Criminologists who study domestic street gangs have long realized that immigrants coming into the United States are far more likely to fall prey to street gangs, especially ethnic street gangs, than native American citizens.¹⁰⁵ A new country can have a different language, culture, customs, and religions. In an effort to feel more comfortable with their new surroundings, immigrants tend to seek out people and groups with whom they share similarities.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Speckhard. *Talking to Terrorists*, 12359.

¹⁰⁴ Sanchez-Jankowski, "Gangs and Social Change," 191–216.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

One of the more popular immigrant gangs in the United States is Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13.¹⁰⁶ MS-13 is an extremely violent Salvadorian street gang from the Pico-Union section of Central Los Angeles.¹⁰⁷ It was originally formed to provide its members with protection from other Hispanic street gangs.¹⁰⁸ This protection is a positive value the gang provides its members. However, Alex Sanchez, an admitted gang member, believed the gang gave its members much more. He recounts:

I was MS-13 and yes, there was some dangerous characters there but that is not the whole story. People have come to us because they want to belong somewhere, because they felt safe, because the system didn't provide the structure that immigrants needed.¹⁰⁹

Salvadorian immigrants migrating to California found familiar ties with MS-13, which made the group attractive. It provided its members a structure and means to survive in their new environment, and offered acceptance, a sense of companionship and family. These positive values enhance a person's self-esteem and entice immigrants to join.

Jamal and Alex had similar challenges with identity. Both believed they were out-group members in the communities in which they lived. The terrorist organization and street gang provided the boys with an in-group, which made them feel safer in their communities and provided them both an identity and situational advantages (i.e., security over non-members). These group dynamics are better explained through a theory called social identity theory (SIT).

C. SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY

First developed in 1970s by psychologists Henri Tajfel and John Turner, SIT postulates a person's identity is conceived, in part, through his or her membership in a

¹⁰⁶ Jorja Leap, *Jumped in: What Gangs Taught Me about Violence, Drugs, Love, and Redemption* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2012), 17–18.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

particular group. The individual adopts an identity put forth by the group and the individual's behavior becomes governed by intra-group politics. Tajfel explains:

SIT is part of an individual's self-concept derived from his or her knowledge of membership of a social group or groups including the value and emotional significance the individual gets from being a member in that group.¹¹⁰

The first step in SIT is the idea of self-categorization. This is simply placing oneself in a particular category or group to which the person believes he or she is similar.¹¹¹ This is the person's in-group. The individual, once in the group, then self-categorizes as having similar characteristics to the other group members. "What kind of person am I?," the group member asks himself; "I am like other members of the group." This self-categorization also affects behavior; once a person identifies as part of a group, he or she will start to imitate the behavior of other group members.¹¹²

SIT also explains that people want to enhance their social status and self-esteem.¹¹³ A group member's self-esteem is tied to the status and identity of the group, so groups strive to provide their members with a positive distinctiveness.¹¹⁴ If the group cannot do so or if it deflates a member's self-esteem, the member may leave or join another group.¹¹⁵

Once a person identifies with a particular in-group, there is a strong desire for that person to compare him or herself to members of other groups.¹¹⁶ If the person does not feel he is faring better than members of other groups, he may seek to leave the group.¹¹⁷ An example of this group dynamic occurred with Hezbollah and the Amal Movement.

¹¹⁰ Henri Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 3.

¹¹¹ Kevin Durrheim, "Introduction to Social Identity Posted by Henri Tajfel." YouTube video, 11:35, 2014, posted by Henri Tajfel, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tf5_gWa3h2g (accessed July 18, 2015).

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Durrheim, YouTube video.

¹¹⁷ Cairns, "Intergroup Conflict in Northern Ireland," 285.

1. Hezbollah and the Amal Movement

In the late 1980s, two terrorist organizations, Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, were competing for Shia members in Lebanon.¹¹⁸ Both groups had similar ideologies and group compositions. Hezbollah, however, was able to offer its members a better military, a better regional standing and more state support from Iran.¹¹⁹ Therefore, the group enticed more members.

Amal Movement members, recognizing their inferiority in comparison to Hezbollah, had a clear incentive to leave their in-group. After all, their self-esteem and their self-worth were attached to a lesser identity. Subsequently, many Amal members left and joined Hezbollah.¹²⁰ This group dynamic exists for gangs as well.

2. Crips and Bloods

In the late 1960s, several former Black Panther Party members started a street gang called the “Avenue Crips” in the South Side of Los Angeles. Eventually, this new gang evolved into the modern-day Crips gang. At the time, there were many smaller localized gangs operating on the streets of Los Angeles, but the Crips’ larger size provided its members with greater protection and resources.¹²¹ The gang’s powerful size and brutal reputation, however, would eventually lead to its fractioning.

In 1972, several Crips members left the gang because it had become too violent.¹²² A fraction of the group felt the gang’s extreme violence was causing them to develop a negative reputation.¹²³ Eventually, negative attitudes toward this violent

¹¹⁸ Anders Strindberg, *What Is Social Identity?* (PowerPoint). (Monterey, CA: Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014).

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Stanley “Tookie” Williams, *Blue Rage, Black Redemption: A Memoir*, (Pleasant Hill, CA: Damamli, 2004).

¹²² “Bloods (Piru) Gangs in Compton, California,” StreetGangs.com, accessed July 18, 2015, <http://www.streetgangs.com/bloods/compton>.

¹²³ Virginia State Police, *Bloods Street Gang Intelligence Report* (North Chesterfield, VA: Virginia State Police, 2008); Darnell Hunt and Ana-Christina Ramon, *Black Los Angeles: American Dreams and Racial Realities* (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 151–152.

identity outweighed the protection the gang was able to provide.¹²⁴ A few members left the group to form their own gang, called the Piru Bloods, a name they took from Piru Street—the street where the gang first started.¹²⁵ Much like Amal, once the Crips members' self-esteem diminished, they left the group.¹²⁶

The group identity supplied by the Crips, Bloods, MS-13 and Hezbollah offered members a particular identity. It helped them identify what kind of people they were, providing a social identity based on group membership. For those who do not join a group, however, a process called “identity foreclosure” may provide a better explanation.

D. IDENTITY FORECLOSURE

Identity researcher and psychologist James Marcia expanded upon Erikson's work and introduced a stage of identity development called “identity foreclosure.”¹²⁷ Put simply, foreclosing on an identity occurs when an individual adopts an already constructed identity rather than fashioning his or her own.¹²⁸ There is no exploration on the part of the individual—no periods of re-thinking, sorting through and/or trying on various roles.¹²⁹ The person chooses or accepts an identity that is pre-fabricated. The individual does not necessarily have to join a group for this to occur.

1. Raymond Martinez

Raymond Martinez, a gang member from Fresno, California is serving a life sentence for murder, which he committed when he was just 16 years old. He explains how he developed his identity:

[My] reason for joining the gang was because my older brother was already a gang member. I looked up to him because he was respected within the gang and considered a leader. Since he was someone I looked

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ “Bloods (Piru) Gangs in Compton, California,” StreetGangs.com.

¹²⁷ Peggy Walker, “James Marcia's Identity States.” *Walker's World*, accessed July 15, 2015, <http://socialscientist.us/nphs/psychIB/psychpdfs/Marcia.pdf>.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Kroger and Marcia, *Handbook of Identity Theory and Research*, 34.

up to, I felt it was my duty to be like him and copy his idea of manhood—even if it meant following in his risky footsteps.¹³⁰

Raymond has spent his time in prison trying to discover who he really is. He recounts not taking the time early on in life to explore who he wanted to be. He was looking for an identity others would respect.¹³¹ Rather than pause to think about what kind of person he wanted to be, or to explore his options, he simply copied or “foreclosed” on the identity of his brother.

In an environment overrun with gang members, there may be few available positive role models for someone like Raymond. A gang may be the most enticing or easiest option. Imitating or adopting a family member’s identity is not exclusive to street gangs; terrorists have done the same.

2. Yacoub and the Dubrovka Theatre Massacre

On October 23, 2002, forty armed Chechens from the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR), the International Islamic Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB) and the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs took over 800 hostages inside the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow.¹³² The terrorist attack ended with the death of all 40 terrorists and over 129 hostages.¹³³

One such terrorist was named Yacoub.¹³⁴ Yacoub progressed along a path of radicalization starting with the death of his father and older brother, both of whom were killed fighting the Russians in 1995, when he was only 15 years old. Though his radicalized family members had passed, Yacoub still foreclosed on the family identity. Yacoub’s cousin explains:

¹³⁰ Raymond Martinez, “Seeing the Light Behind Bars,” LA Progressive, February 24, 2015, <https://www.laprogressive.com/life-behind-bars/>.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² United States Department of State, “Other Groups of Concern,” in *Country Reports on Terrorism*, ed. United States Department of State (Washington, DC: United States Department of State, 2006), 153–163.

¹³³ Nick Paton Walsh, “Families Claim Death Toll from Gas in Moscow Siege Kept Secret,” *Guardian*, October 17, 2003, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/oct/18/chechnya.russia>.

¹³⁴ Yacoub is a pseudonym for a real person who took part in the siege.

[Yacoub] became very closed and gloomy saying that he should avenge his family members...Then he began to be interested in religion although he didn't even know how to pray. His mother was very much afraid of these changes that occurred in him so quickly. But she no longer had influence over him...After his father's death, our extremist uncle was the biggest authority for my cousin. He started to read the wahhabists' books that he took from his uncle. He changed externally, grew his hair long and grew a beard. Then he went to Khattab (Saudi born rebel leader in the terrorist camp) in the Jaamat, a group where his uncle was included.¹³⁵

Full of anger and wanting revenge, Yacoub adopted the identity of his uncle, his last remaining adult role model. Unfortunately, his uncle was a violent extremist whose in-group was a terrorist organization. This identity provided Yacoub his desired path to revenge.¹³⁶

Raymond wanted respect, Yacoub wanted revenge, and both foreclosed on an identity that was able to deliver.

E. NEGATIVE IDENTITY

Society plays a major role in labeling both certain behaviors and certain groups as "good" or "bad." Not all societies, however, are alike. What is labeled bad in one society may be good in another.¹³⁷ If we accept the notion that joining a street gang or terrorist organization is bad across most societies, why do individuals decide to do so anyway, especially considering a negative identity's ability to diminish self-esteem?

Psychologist and behavioral scientist Jeanne Knutson recognized the difficulty of choosing a negative identity. She postulates that an individual may adopt a negative identity if he or she believes the path to a positive identity is blocked.¹³⁸ With a positive identity unattainable, the person is left with two choices: accept a failed identity, which leads to a devalued self-image, or take on the most easily attainable identity, which could

¹³⁵ Speckhard, *Talking to Terrorists*, 873.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Jeanne N. Knutson, "Social and Psychodynamic Pressures toward a Negative Identity: The Case of an American Revolutionary Terrorist," in *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism*, eds. Yonah Alexander and John M. Gleason, 105–152 (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981).

¹³⁸ Ibid.

be a negative one.¹³⁹ By adopting a negative identity, the person avoids inner fragmentation or an identity crisis.¹⁴⁰ Erikson agrees, suggesting that a person will adopt a negative identity rather than go without an identity at all; a person has to have an identity, positive or negative, to progress in life.¹⁴¹

F. SUMMARY

Identity is a compilation of evolving characteristics that compose a person's personality.¹⁴² Before one can be happy and co-mingle with others, one must achieve a foundational identity; if one cannot, the result is an identity crisis, which can be relieved through association with a group.¹⁴³ People will choose an in-group that provide them with some sort of positive value.¹⁴⁴ Conversely, they will leave in-groups if the group provides them with negative value, as was the case with the Amal Movement terrorists. Furthermore, when a person does not explore different roles and merely adopts an already developed identity, that person is said to be “foreclosing” on an identity.¹⁴⁵ An individual can take on an identity without officially joining a group and/or participating in intra-group activities.¹⁴⁶ This was the case for Raymond Martinez, who adopted the identity of his brother, a street gang member, and Yacoub, who adopted the identity of his uncle, a terrorist. Finally, a person will adopt a negative identity—such as a terrorist or gang member—if he or she perceives the path to a positive identity is blocked or unattainable.¹⁴⁷ A person will adopt a negative identity rather than possess a less satisfying one or no identity at all.¹⁴⁸

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Erik H. Erikson, *Identity: Youth and Crisis* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1968).

¹⁴² Fearon, *What Is Identity?*

¹⁴³ Erikson, *Identity: Youth and Crisis*; Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 3.

¹⁴⁴ Durrheim, YouTube video.

¹⁴⁵ Kroger and Marcia, *Handbook of Identity Theory and Research*.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 176.

¹⁴⁷ Knutson, *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism*.

¹⁴⁸ Erikson, *Identity: Youth and Crisis*, 176.

Each of the street gang members and terrorists described in this chapter had similar experiences with identity. It can therefore be said that identity and the problems associated with its development are common between street gang members and terrorists.

III. POVERTY

When thinking about poverty, the word “money” immediately comes to mind.¹⁴⁹ But poverty, more broadly, simply means “lacking,” which could refer to material possessions or even to social conditions such as respect or status.¹⁵⁰ Research over the last few decades has focused on determining if a lack of material possessions is a risk factor for people joining street gangs, which typically exist in socioeconomically poor areas; in fact, street gangs are considered a staple in every metropolitan city in the United States, and they tend to flourish in the poorer parts of those cities.¹⁵¹ Just because somebody is poor, however, does not mean that he or she will join a street gang.¹⁵² So socioeconomic poverty alone cannot explain gang membership.

This chapter sets out to determine to what extent poverty motivates people to join violent groups such as street gangs and terrorist organizations. The chapter also discusses environments in which street gangs and terrorist organizations thrive based on their ability to provide scarce resources. Ultimately, the chapter concludes that some street gang members and terrorists similarly join their respective groups to meet needs.¹⁵³

A. RELATIVE DEPRIVATION THEORY

Relative deprivation theory posits that people feel deprived when they compare their situations to others'.¹⁵⁴ The specific deprivation is subjective to the individual; it can be money, beauty, a new job, or any number of animate or inanimate things.¹⁵⁵ Moghaddam writes: “Relative deprivation...is how individuals feel about their situation

¹⁴⁹ Roshan Shah, “Poverty: Much More Than Just Economic,” Life Positive, accessed July 15, 2015. <http://lifepositive.com/poverty-much-just-economic/>.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Klein and Maxson. *Street Gang: Patterns and Policies*, 213–215, 67l; Shelden, Tracy, and Brown, *Youth Gangs in American Society*, 180.

¹⁵² Klein and Maxson. *Street Gang: Patterns and Policies*, 67.

¹⁵³ Shelden, Tracy, and Brown, *Youth Gangs in American Society*; Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin, *Delinquency and Opportunity* (New York: Free Press, 1960).

¹⁵⁴ Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism,” 162–163.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

relative to particular others, how deprived they feel subjectively and in a comparative sense, rather than how they are doing according to objective criteria.”¹⁵⁶ For example, you may like your car, but when you look across to your neighbor’s driveway and see a shiny, expensive, new car, your own car is now a beat-up old clunker. You start developing feelings of deprivation, believing that you deserve or are entitled to a new car, just like your neighbor, leading to frustration.

Breaking it down further, Runciman outlined two types of deprivation: egoistic and fraternalistic.¹⁵⁷ Egoistic relative deprivation is a personal feeling of having less compared to similar individuals.¹⁵⁸ Fraternalistic deprivation is the same feeling of having less, but toward a similarly situated group rather than an individual.¹⁵⁹

B. STRAIN THEORY

Strain Theory expands upon relative deprivation theory to account for frustration.¹⁶⁰ Advanced by Robert Merton, strain theory postulates that society has perceived goals for its members, who are under a “strain” to accomplish those goals.¹⁶¹ To help alleviate that strain, society has created socially accepted ways in which to accomplish those goals.¹⁶²

One such way to reach societal goals is to conform.¹⁶³ People under strain can accept the defined goals of their culture and also the socially accepted ways to accomplish them. For example, if a person’s goal is to become a doctor, the person will accept going to medical school in order to become one. The goal—and the means necessary to reach it—are accepted.

¹⁵⁶ Mogaddam, “From the Terrorists’ Point of View,” 46.

¹⁵⁷ W.G. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice: A Study of Attitudes to Social Inequality in Twentieth Century England* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁰ Sheldon, Tracy, and Brown, *Youth Gangs in American Society*, 183–184.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ “6.2 Merton Strain Theory,” YouTube video, 8:19, posted by “Kymichi100,” July 5, 2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fvVd9oOxTm8>.

Another way is to innovate. The person can accept culturally defined goals, but reject the socially accepted ways in which to accomplish them, forging his or her own path to success.¹⁶⁴ For example, a person's goal may be to own a new, expensive car. Society may dictate the person to secure a good-paying job, allowing the individual to save up for the car. But the person may also accept the goal of getting a new car but reject the notion of having to work; instead, he or she they may innovate by selling illegal narcotics to gain the funds, or by stealing the car.

Yet another option is to rebel. In this case, the person not only rejects society's goals but also rejects any socially acceptable means in which to accomplish those goals. Instead, those who rebel elect to form their own goals and develop their own means to achieve them.¹⁶⁵

Regardless of the behavior pattern, if a person believes his or her goals are blocked or unattainable, frustration will set in. The person will then seek mechanisms to alleviate that frustration.¹⁶⁶ If a gang or terrorist group presents itself as an appropriate mechanism, then it is reasonable that someone experiencing deprivation may look to join.¹⁶⁷

In the article "Gangs: 'We Want Money,'" street gang members around Ann Arbor, Michigan were asked what drew them to gang life. Gang member No.6 explained:

It's just a hustle. We're just out here making money. I want a nice steady job, maybe out in a factory somewhere where I can make some money. (But) The honkeys (white people) got all the money- the honkeys and the Arabs got all the money, we just trying to get some money.¹⁶⁸

Gang member No.6 felt economically deprived compared to the white and Arab people in his community; they had all the jobs, and so No. 6 was forced to look elsewhere. Gangs can act like unconventional businesses, generating money for their

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Sheldon, Tracy, and Brown. *Youth Gangs in American Society*, 183–184.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 188.

¹⁶⁸ John Sinclair, "Gangs: 'We Want Money,'" *Ann Arbor Sun*, September 3, 1976, 3.

members mostly through illegal activities.¹⁶⁹ No.6 accepted society's socially accepted ways to make money, but this avenue was blocked. So he innovated and joined a gang to accomplish his goal.

Many gang members are from poor families.¹⁷⁰ Some desire to have expensive things like trendy clothes, fancy cars and big houses.¹⁷¹ Coming from a poor family may affect their ability to purchase these items, but it does not diminish the items' allure. Jankowski describes a trait he calls "defiant individualism," in which a defiant individual is a person who will become involved with making money, regardless of legality, and will thwart any attempt to stop him.¹⁷²

There is a scarcity of resources in poorer communities, and the people who live in these communities know they have to be aggressive to compete and secure them.¹⁷³ The question then becomes, does participation in a gang provide a material advantage in securing those resources? Slump, a 16-year-old gang banger from Los Angeles, described this battle for resources:

Well, I really didn't want to join the gang when I was a little younger because I had this idea that I could make more money if I would do some gigs (illegal activity to make money) on my own. Now I don't know, I mean, I wasn't wrong. I could make more money on my own, but there are more things happening with the gang, so it's a little more even in terms of when the money comes in...Let's just say there is more possibilities for a more steady amount of income if you need it.¹⁷⁴

In an effort to increase his socio-economic status, Slump calculated the benefits of joining versus not joining. Although he could have made more money on his own, the gang provided him more opportunities for him to do so, and so he decided to join.

¹⁶⁹ Sanchez-Jankowski, "Gangs and Social Change," 194.

¹⁷⁰ Martin Sanchez-Jankowski, *Island in the Street* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 26.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Sanchez-Jankowski, "Gangs and Social Change," 201.

¹⁷⁴ Sanchez-Jankowski, *Island in the Street*, 26.

A similar example can be found in Hamas—a Palestinian Islamic terrorist organization with a deep resentment toward Israel for taking their land and making the Palestinians refugees.¹⁷⁵ Many Palestinians consider the land of Israel their rightful homeland. Ziad al Fahudi, a Palestinian member of Hamas, and his son, Fadi Ziad al Fahudi, along with 15 other members of the Jihad Mosque soccer team conducted a terrorist attack in the Israeli settlement of Hebron.¹⁷⁶ On March 8, 2003, Fadi snuck past Israeli security forces and began shooting Jewish settlers.¹⁷⁷ When the security forces moved in, Fadi blew himself up with improvised explosives. According to authorities, Fadi was responsible for the death of five settlers before he committed suicide.¹⁷⁸

These terrorists wanted a homeland. They felt deprived of a homeland by Jewish settlers.¹⁷⁹ In retaliation, they conducted a series of bombings. The “strain” caused by Fadi Ziad al Fahudi’s unmet need, coupled with his belief that the Jewish settlers were blocking his ability to satisfy this need, led him to violence.

C. SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION

Territory affects people in other ways as well. Socially disorganized communities can be described as those with ineffective educational systems, high unemployment, weak governance and weak community cohesion.¹⁸⁰ An ecological theory of gangs was first presented by one of the earliest street gang researchers, Dr. Frederick Thrasher. He wrote:

Gangs present the spontaneous effort of boys to create a society for themselves where none adequate to their needs exist...The failure of normally directing and controlling customs and institutions to function efficiently in the boy’s experience is indicated by disintegration of family life, inefficiency of schools, formalism and externality of religion...All these factors enter into the picture of the moral and economic frontier, and,

¹⁷⁵ Speckhard, *Talking to Terrorists*, 245–261.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 6408.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 6441–6650.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

coupled with deterioration in housing, sanitation, and other conditions of life in the slum, give the impression of general disorganization and decay. The gang functions with reference to these conditions in two ways: It offers a substitute for what society fails to give...It fills a gap and affords an escape...Thus, the gang, itself a natural and spontaneous type of organization arising through conflict, is a symptom of disorganization in the larger social framework.¹⁸¹

In his study of the various street gangs in Chicago, Thrasher concluded that people join street gangs as a direct reaction to the problems faced in their environments. The gangs provide their members with mechanisms to survive where social institutions have failed.

Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay later expanded upon Thrasher's concept and developed a theory called social disorganization, in which they attempted to link individual delinquency to socially disorganized communities.¹⁸² According to their theory, the cause of delinquency shifted away from the individual and was placed solely on the person's neighborhood.¹⁸³ Delinquency, they argued, is just a normal response to a person's environment. Shaw and McKay furthermore found that areas dense with people of lower economic status, poor policing, ineffective educational systems, high immigration and corruption, all had street gangs.¹⁸⁴ To them, this was no coincidence. One thing all these areas had in common was the lack of resources, which created competition among residents.¹⁸⁵ If local governance is unable to adequately satisfy people's needs, disorganization will ensue; people will seek opportunities—illegal, if need be—to satisfy their needs.¹⁸⁶

Prior to World War II, for example, street gangs as we see them today did not exist in Los Angeles.¹⁸⁷ Many black families migrated from southern rural towns in search of greener

¹⁸¹ Thrasher, *The Gang*, 12–13.

¹⁸² Shelden, Tracy, and Brown, *Youth Gangs in American Society*, 180.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ Sanchez-Jankowski, "Gangs and Social Change," 191–216, 201.

¹⁸⁶ Thrasher, *The Gang*, 228–231.

¹⁸⁷ Shelden, Tracy, and Brown, *Youth Gangs in American Society*, 10–13.

pastures in California's booming aerospace, automobile and construction industries. What they found when they got there was all but the "American Dream."¹⁸⁸ Many found themselves locked out of jobs that were dominated by a white middle class. They were racially discriminated against and alienated from the old social values that had sustained their previous generations. By the mid-1950s, unemployment among black men jumped to 30 percent.¹⁸⁹ The social institutions of Los Angeles began to crumble under the weight of migrants, many of whom were uneducated and unemployed.

In response, black youths began to band together into small gangs with names such as Slausons, Gladiators, Watts, Flips and Rebel Rousers.¹⁹⁰ These gangs' original purpose was to defend against other racial and ethnic gangs, but they soon became economic providers for their members.¹⁹¹ These groups thrived and expanded because the city's social institutions were unable to provide adequate resources to community members. The City of Los Angeles was also feckless in combating these gangs directly as well.

If socially disorganized communities all have gangs, then one would assume that socially well-organized communities should not. But do they? Sociologist William Julius Wilson conducted an analysis of the street gangs on the south side of Chicago in the 1940s.¹⁹² At the time, the south side was a poor, mostly black urban area with a large number of street gangs. Despite these rising attributes, it was discovered that the community showed no increase in crime and gang activity.¹⁹³ Wilson reasoned that the south side of Chicago was still socially well-organized at the time.¹⁹⁴ It still had strong economic and social institutions that created strong social controls; this thwarted an increase in crime and gang activity.¹⁹⁵ Wilson's conclusions showed a correlation

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Sanchez-Jankowski, "Gangs and Social Change," 197.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Shelden, Tracy, and Brown, *Youth Gangs in American Society*, 197–198.

¹⁹⁵ Sanchez-Jankowski, "Gangs and Social Change," 197–198.

between lower delinquency rates and higher social organization. However, the south side of Chicago still had a large number of gangs. His analysis did not determine why an individual would seek to join a gang, but it did prove people still join gangs despite living in socially organized communities.

Like Los Angeles, some areas in the Middle East provide fertile ground for violent groups to thrive. Take, for example, Iraq. Since Saddam Hussein was ousted in 2003 by coalition forces, Iraq has struggled to develop and sustain basic functions of governance and social institutions.¹⁹⁶ This failure has caused disorganization in the country and spawned the emergence of terrorist groups.¹⁹⁷ One such group is the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, more commonly known as ISIS¹⁹⁸ As Iraq was trying to establish a basic system of governance, ISIS built its strength and popularity in the Iraqi governorates of Baghdad, Al Anbar and Diyala. ISIS did not form primarily to compete for resources, but to assemble and establish an Islamic Caliphate.¹⁹⁹ ISIS grew in stature as the fragile Iraqi government suffered from political unrest and the evaporation of an effective military.²⁰⁰ Iraq's disorganized government was unable to stop the emergence of this terrorist group. The group proliferated throughout the country, eventually spreading all the way to Syria.²⁰¹

D. JOHNNY "MAD DOG" ADAIR

Social disorganization theory also played a role in the making of Irish terrorist Johnny Adair. Better known as "Mad Dog," Adair was an Irish-born political terrorist from the Ulster Freedom Fighters, which was the para-military wing of the Ulster

¹⁹⁶ "How Did it Come To This?" *Economist*, June 21, 2014, <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21604627-crisis-iraq-has-roots-going-far-back-history-recently-folly>.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ali Khedery, "How ISIS Came to Be," *Guardian*, August 22, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/22/syria-iraq-incubators-isis-jihad>.

¹⁹⁹ Khedery, "How ISIS Came to Be."

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Suhaib Anjarini, "The Evolution of ISIS," *Al Monitor*, November 2013, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/security/2013/11/syria-islamic-state-iraq-sham-growth.html>.

Defense Association.²⁰² The organization was created in response to attacks on Protestants by the Irish Republican Army.²⁰³

Adair grew up in Belfast—an Irish neighborhood engulfed in political violence. The area where Adair was raised was poor and residents there were indifferent to crime.²⁰⁴ Prior to 1969, Belfast was experiencing “an unprecedented period of joy and happiness.”²⁰⁵ During this time, Adair was an ordinary boy, going to school and attending Sunday church services. It was not until Adair entered secondary school that the area around him started to change for the worse. As Adair entered his teenage years, petty crime, daily riots and fights broke out between Protestants and Catholics in his neighborhood.²⁰⁶ Natasha Smith believes that “if Adair was not subjected to these conditions, or his social environment positively changed, his behavior could have been exceedingly different.”²⁰⁷

Social disorganization theory favors environmental characteristics that influence delinquent behavior over individual behaviors. Soon, Adair started to get caught up in the delinquency around him. In 1979, at the age of 15, he was arrested and convicted of petty theft. One year later he was arrested again for disorderly behavior.²⁰⁸ As the neighborhood around him changed, so did Adair’s behavior. After years of participating in terrorism throughout Ulster, Adair was eventually exiled to Scotland, which had a much better socially organized environment. This new positive environment led Adair to leave the life of terrorism.²⁰⁹

²⁰² Jasmine Natasha Smith, “The Criminal and the Terrorist: A Comparative Criminological Analysis of the Pathways into Crime,” *Internet Journal of Criminology*, 2012: 1–30.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ David Lister and Hugh Jordan, *Mad Dog: The Rise and Fall of Johnny Adair and ‘C Company’*. (Edinburgh and London: Mainstream Publishing, 2004).

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Smith, *Internet Journal of Criminology*, 1–30.

²⁰⁸ Lister and Jordan, *Mad Dog*.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

E. CHAPTER SUMMARY

Most people who lack material resources, status or reputation do not join gangs or terrorist organizations. So poverty alone cannot explain why someone would join such a group. Much like Jankowski's notion of "defiant individualism," people will become members of a particular group if they believe doing so will help them achieve their goals.²¹⁰ Some street gang members and terrorists join their respective groups because they provided them with the mechanisms to achieve their goals. Although joining these groups may not be a socially accepted way of doing so, it may be the only realistic means available to them.

It may not be a coincidence that street gangs and terrorist organizations exist in some of the most impoverished areas around the world. Poor education systems, high unemployment, feckless governments and failing social institutions point toward social disorganization, which shifts the attention away from the individual and posits criminal behavior.²¹¹ When resources are scarce and social and economic institutions are unable to provide for residents, they will look elsewhere.²¹² If street gangs and/or terrorist organizations can provide their members with a competitive advantage over non-members, some people will still join.²¹³

²¹⁰ Sanchez-Jankowski, "Gangs and Social Change," 201.

²¹¹ Ibid., 178–179.

²¹² Thrasher, *The Gang*, 228–231.

²¹³ Ibid.

IV. PROGRESSION

Terrorists are not born; they are made.²¹⁴ For some, the transformation happens rapidly. But for others the path to radicalization happens slowly along a progressing set of life stages. This chapter explores the path of progression that leads an individual to join a street gang or terrorist group, ultimately determining that the progressions are similar.

A. “WAITHOOD”

I would like to talk to you about a story about a small town kid. I don’t know his name but I know his story. He lives in a small village in southern Somalia. His village is near Mogadishu. Drought drives the small village into poverty and to the brink of starvation. With nothing left for him there, he leaves for the big city, in this case, Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. When he arrives, there are no opportunities, no jobs, no way forward. He ends up living in a tent city on the outskirts of Mogadishu. Maybe a year passes, nothing.

One day, he’s approached by a gentleman who offers to take him to lunch, then to dinner, to breakfast. He meets this dynamic group of people, and they give him a break. He’s given a bit of money to buy himself some new clothes, money to send back home to his family. He is introduced to this young woman. He eventually gets married. He starts this new life. He has a purpose in life.

One beautiful day in Mogadishu, under the azure blue sky, a car bomb goes off. That small town kid with the big city dreams was the suicide bomber, and that dynamic group of people was al Shabaab, a terrorist organization linked to al Qaeda.²¹⁵

Failed social, economic and governmental institutions can cause stagnation in one’s life.²¹⁶ “Waithood” is a term used by sociologist Alcinda Honwana to explain this stagnation in her research with African youth.²¹⁷ “Waithood,” she says, is a state of stagnation, or limbo, between childhood and adulthood, in which many Middle Eastern

²¹⁴ Speckhard, *Talking to Terrorists*, 15909.

²¹⁵ Ali, *The Link Between Unemployment and Terrorism*.

²¹⁶ Dhillon and Yousef, *Generation in Waiting*, 11.

²¹⁷ Honwana, ““Waithood.””

adolescents are stuck because of failed neo-liberal policies, poor governance and political instability in their areas.²¹⁸ Young males and females are graduating from school only to find there are no jobs available to them. Often, their education has failed to prepare them for the jobs that are available.²¹⁹ Many then move to urban centers in hopes of increasing their chances of finding employment, only to be embroiled in poverty and despair.²²⁰ Ideas of relative deprivation and social exclusion generate feelings of frustration among these people stuck in limbo.²²¹

The failure of communities and governments to provide positive opportunities has caused people to look elsewhere, and terrorist organizations have stepped in to fill this void.²²² The longer the period of “waithood,” the more susceptible these people are to join such groups.²²³

Middle Eastern adolescents are not the only ones who feel they are in limbo after graduating from school.²²⁴ Donte, a street gang member from San Diego, California, his reasoning for joining a gang:

What do I do once I get out of school? You know? I did my daily deed to keep from getting thrown out the house, but now I’m walking around the neighborhood and I don’t have anything to do.²²⁵

Donte and the boy in Ali’s story are both stuck in “waithood.” They are searching for an opportunity to progress in life. Donte joined a gang because that was the only group that offered him an opportunity to move out of a stalled life.

According to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory, people have five basic human needs they must satisfy to successfully evolve and be happy: biology, safety, love, self-

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Dhillon and Yousef, *Generation in Waiting*, 11.

²²⁰ Ali, *The Link Between Unemployment and Terrorism*.

²²¹ Dhillon and Yousef, *Generation in Waiting*, 11.

²²² Ali, *The Link Between Unemployment and Terrorism*.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Honwana, ““Waithood,””19.

²²⁵ San Diego Deputy Sheriffs’ Association, *Gang, Groups, Cults: An Informational Guide to Understanding* (San Diego: Stuart-Bradley Productions, 1989).

esteem and self-actualization.²²⁶ Seen as a pyramid, this theory places biology on the bottom tier and self-actualization at the top. Self-actualization refers to the pinnacle state in which a person reaches his/his or her full potential.²²⁷ The people in “waithood” cannot reach self-actualization, because they are stuck between safety and esteem. In this stratus, they are looking for financial security and the ability to marry, raise a family and finally garnish the respect that comes with obtaining those things.²²⁸

B. THE STAIRCASE TO TERRORISM

Similar theories have been created specifically for terrorists. One such theory is Dr. Fathali Moghaddam’s staircase to terrorism.²²⁹ Dr. Moghaddam explains his model:

I have used the metaphor of a narrowing staircase leading to the terrorist act at the top of a building. The staircase leads to higher and higher floors, and whether a person remains on a particular floor depends on the doors and spaces that person imagines to be open to him or her on that floor. The fundamentally important feature of the situation is not only the actual number of floors, stairs, rooms and so on, but how people perceive the building and the doors they think are open to them. As individuals climb the staircase, they see fewer choices, until the only possible outcome is the destruction of others, oneself, or both.²³⁰

The majority of people begin on the ground floor, where some experience relative deprivation in regards to material resources.²³¹ Perceptions of unfairness, injustice and unfair treatment can lead to frustration and resentment. According to Moghaddam, only a small number of people will leave the ground floor and climb the staircase. Each of the next steps will include fewer and fewer people. Only a very small number of people will eventually reach the top and commit a terrorist act.²³²

²²⁶ Shelden, Tracy, and Brown, *Youth Gangs in American Society*, 196–7.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism,” 161–169.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid., 193–4.

²³² Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research,” *Journal of Strategic Security* 4, no. 4 (Winter 2011), 39.

Those wishing to improve their situations climb to the first floor.²³³ On this floor, an individual searches for solutions.²³⁴ A person's perception of available options becomes important; if a person believes there is an adequate remedy to his or her situation, then the person will remain on that floor.²³⁵ If not, frustration and resentment will continue to build, especially if the individual begins to blame others for not being able to satisfy his or her own needs.²³⁶ When this level of frustration produces feelings of aggression, the individual ascends to the third floor, where he or she becomes sympathetic toward violent extremist ideology.²³⁷ A person continues to climb the staircase until he or she joins a terrorist group and/or commits an act of terror.²³⁸

Moghaddam's model is exemplified in the case of Timothy McVeigh—the terrorist responsible for the deadly bombing of the Federal Alfred P. Murray building in Oklahoma City in 1995.²³⁹ After graduating from high school in 1986, McVeigh attended a local two-year business college for computing. His high school classmates believed him to be their “most promising computer programmer.”²⁴⁰ In 1988, McVeigh joined the United States Army because he wanted to work on his survival skills.²⁴¹ By every account, McVeigh's time in the Army was successful. He scored well on his tests and was selected for an experimental program called Cohesion, Operation Readiness and Training. He entered Special Forces training in September of 1988 and, during the first Iraqi War, achieved the rank of sergeant and received four awards, including the Army Commendation Medal.²⁴² After his time fighting, McVeigh finally got a chance to

²³³ Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism,” 163.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, 163–164.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*

²³⁷ Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism II,” 40.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*

²³⁹ Erin C. Hug, “The Role of Isolation in Radicalization: How Important Is it?,” master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013, 39.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 41.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 42.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 42–44.

compete for a Special Forces position. Unfortunately, he was deemed not physically or mentally ready for the assignment; he was overlooked and not selected for assignment.²⁴³

McVeigh, forced to return to his position at Fort Riley, became bitter and frustrated toward the Army; as these feelings grew, they extended to the U.S. government as a whole. By the end of 1991, he left the Army with an honorary discharge.²⁴⁴ When McVeigh returned home to live with his father in Pendleton, New York, he thought the skills he received in the military and high school would translate into a good-paying job, but he was wrong. Unable to find work in computer programming, he took a low-wage security guard position.²⁴⁵ To make ends meet, he went back to work part-time in the military. McVeigh resented having to work for a government he now hated.²⁴⁶

McVeigh felt his life was stalled, as though he was “moving backwards, not forwards.”²⁴⁷ Eventually, he had a nervous breakdown, and he continually blamed the government for his plight. He resigned from the military, left his father’s house and began looking for a state with minimal government oversight and low taxes. He began writing anti-government letters to newspapers and congressmen, voicing his displeasure. McVeigh’s paranoia toward the U.S. government began to get out of control. Eventually, he joined the Patriot Movement, an anti-government organization that supported citizen militias, as a means to channel his aggression and as an outlet for his fear. His frustration, hatred and aggression ultimately would lead him to commit a terrorist act that killed 168 people, including 19 children attending nursery school.²⁴⁸

Timothy McVeigh started out on the ground floor. He became bitter and frustrated with the U.S. government after not being selected to enter the Army’s Special Forces. His frustration continued to build when he moved in with his father and was unable to find employment as a computer programmer. To make ends meet, he had to

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 52.

reluctantly rejoin the military. In an attempt to better his situation (progress to the second step), McVeigh left his father's house in search of a state with less government oversight. As his bitterness and frustration against the U.S. government grew, McVeigh joined an anti-government group (the third step), and eventually climbed the stairs until he became a terrorist.

C. FIVE-STAGE GANG PROGRESSION MODEL

Progression theories and models have been developed for street gang members as well as terrorists. Dr. Matthew O'Dean, in his book *Gang Injunctions and Abatement*, provided a model of progression for street gang members.²⁴⁹ According to O'Dean, an individual starts out as being sympathetic to gang life. He or she then loosely associates with gang members. Eventually the cohesion gets stronger, culminating with the person becoming a gang leader.²⁵⁰ O'Dean described this as occurring in five stages:

- (1) **Stage 1: At-Risk or Peripheral.** People involved at this stage are not considered gang members, but they know and associate with known gang members intermittently. At this stage, the person may idolize gang life and wish to emulate it, but his or her behavior has not yet changed enough to pursue membership.²⁵¹
- (2) **Stage 2: Associates and Affiliates.** Individuals begin to progress toward the gang lifestyle, but do not officially join a gang.²⁵² In this stage, the person starts associating with gang members on a regular basis. They consider gang life normal and acceptable. These types of associates are sometimes called "wannabes," "peewees" or "tiny gangsters."²⁵³
- (3) **Stage 3: Gang Members.** The budding gang member now begins hanging out exclusively with other gang members. Sometimes he or she even excludes relationships with people outside the gang.²⁵⁴ At this stage, new members of the gang begin participating in group activities including

²⁴⁹ O'Dean, *Gang Injunctions and Abatement*, 12–17.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

delinquency and crime. Individuals typically “reject authority and society” in general and wish only to achieve further status in the gang.²⁵⁵

- (4) **Stage 4: Hard-Core Gang Members.** Gang members at this stage are fully committed to the gang and gang activities. They are called “OG’s” or “Original Gangsters.”²⁵⁶ Their lives become centered on the gang lifestyle and the values of the gang. They will commit any crime to further the goals and objectives of the gang.²⁵⁷
- (5) **Stage 5: Gang Leaders.** Finally, the gang member reaches the pinnacle of the gang and becomes its leader. Gang leaders garner the most respect, direct the gang’s activities, control recruitment and can even decide who stays in the gang.²⁵⁸

Sanyika Shakur, also known as “Monster Kody Scott,” is a self-admitted gang leader of the modern-day Crip-Eight Trays gang. He recounts his sixteen years as a street gang member in his book, *Monster: The Autobiography of an L.A. Gang Member*. Shakur, aligning with O’Dean’s model, believed his ascension to a leadership position of the gang was a progression from “little homie to O.G.”²⁵⁹

Shakur started his progression when he was only 14 years old, loosely hanging around Eight Tray Gang (ETG) members. He was full of “ambition, vitality, and ruthlessness to succeed.”²⁶⁰ Although not officially an ETG, he hung around at the Rosecrans Skating Rink in Los Angeles, where other gang members would congregate to “promote their name and set (ETG).”²⁶¹ As time went on, Shakur began hanging out exclusively with other gang members. Less than a year later, he was involved in shootings and petty crime for the gang.²⁶² At the age of 19, Shakur recounts:

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Sanyika Shakur, *Monster: The Autobiography of an L.A. Gang Member* (New York: Grove Press, 1993), 14–18.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Ibid., 23–26.

For the past five years I had gotten up every morning and ironed my gear [gang clothing] with thoughts of nothing else but doing propaganda for the set. I did this with all the zeal of a religious fanatic.²⁶³

In 1991, twelve years after starting his progression as a gang member, Shakur was arrested and convicted for murder in the brutal slaying of a rival crack dealer.²⁶⁴ He was sentenced to seven years in prison, successfully progressing along O'Dean's model.

D. CHAPTER SUMMARY

People are not born street gang members or terrorists; they join their respective groups through a progression or staircase.²⁶⁵ Adolescents can be stuck in "waithood," when failed social, economic and government institutions are not providing for them.²⁶⁶ Some adolescents become frustrated and join a terrorist organization or gang because they are the only groups that offer them a way out of this stagnation.²⁶⁷ Based upon the theories and examples described in this chapter, some street gang members and terrorists progress similarly into their respective groups.

²⁶³ Ibid., 39.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., 379.

²⁶⁵ O'Dean, *Gang Injunctions and Abatement*; Moghaddam, "The Staircase to Terrorism."

²⁶⁶ Honwana, "Waithood," 19–20; Dhillon and Yousef, *Generation in Waiting*, 11.

²⁶⁷ Ali, *The Link Between Unemployment and Terrorism*.

V. PEER INFLUENCE

One of the consistent predictors of group membership is the influence of peers.²⁶⁸ If peer behavior is negative, even criminal, then there is a high probability the individual's behavior will be negative as well.²⁶⁹ Additionally, peer networks and peer influences have been shown to be consistent characteristics of group membership.²⁷⁰ This chapter explores how peer influence similarly affects membership in both street gangs and terrorist organizations.

A. BACKGROUND

People grow and learn through interaction with others starting at birth.²⁷¹ Those we view as similar to ourselves (whether through abilities, pedigrees, backgrounds, socioeconomic status or other attributes) we call peers.²⁷² Some common peers are family, friends, schoolmates and neighbors. Put simply, a peer is someone we could consider equal to ourselves in some way or another.²⁷³

Peers create a condition known as peer pressure, which refers to “influence exerted by an individual or group that encourages others to change their attitudes, values or behaviors to conform to the groups’.”²⁷⁴ The individual does not necessarily have to agree with the group, but the pressure to conform is so strong the individual gives in.²⁷⁵ Peer pressure can be positive or negative depending on what it is the individual is being encouraged to do. For example, if the goal is for a student to get good grades, having peers who influence the student to do better in school would represent a positive form of

²⁶⁸ Klein and Maxson, *Street Gang: Patterns and Policies*, 147.

²⁶⁹ Hila J. Spear and Pamela A. Kulbok, “Adolescent Health Behaviors and Related Factors: A Review,” *Public Health Nursing* 18, no. 2 (March–April 2001) 83–93.

²⁷⁰ Klein and Maxson, *Street Gang: Patterns and Policies*, 147.

²⁷¹ Tolbert, YouTube video.

²⁷² “Peer Pressure,” faqs.org.

²⁷³ Tolbert, YouTube video.

²⁷⁴ “Peer Pressure,” faqs.org.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

peer pressure. On the other hand, strong empirical evidence supports the claim that an individual who has substance-abusing peers has a high probability of also abusing.²⁷⁶ In fact, substance abusing peers are the strongest predictor of substance abuse among individuals than any other factor.²⁷⁷

Although peer pressure exists for people of all ages, it is typically strongest among young adolescents, when it manifests itself in appearances, style, ideology and values.²⁷⁸ Some contend peer pressure diminishes over time because, as a person gets older, he or she becomes less reliant on others.²⁷⁹ But researchers have not discovered any approximate age when this begins.²⁸⁰ And although many consider peer pressure a thing for kids, it can occur at any age.²⁸¹ While people may leave gangs as they get older and the immaturity of the gang no longer appeals to them, some former gang members may then gravitate to more mature organizations.²⁸²

As with age groups, there are differences in peer pressures among specific societies.²⁸³ Peer pressure in collectivist societies, particularly in the Middle East, is stronger than those in Western culture, which tend to be much more individualistic.²⁸⁴ Individualistic societies assume people are independent; they think and behave according to their own beliefs rather than the group's.²⁸⁵ Each person is unique and is encouraged to do things that are personally beneficial.²⁸⁶ Conversely, in collectivist societies, people are interdependent on one another and must constantly act and react to others around

²⁷⁶ Ibid., 522.

²⁷⁷ "Peer Pressure," faqs.org.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Forsyth, *Group Dynamics*, 67–68.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Sanchez-Jankowski, *Island in the Street*, 61.

²⁸³ Ibid., 187.

²⁸⁴ Rod Bond and Peter B. Smith, "Culture and Conformity: Meta-Analysis of Studies Using Asch's Line Judgement Task," *Psychological Bulletin* 119, no. 1 (1996), 126.

²⁸⁵ Forsyth, *Group Dynamics*, 67–68.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

them.²⁸⁷ Each person may be viewed as an individual but ultimately they are inseparable from the group. It is the group that sets the ideology and values around which members are centered.²⁸⁸

B. CULTURAL TRANSMISSION THEORY

One theory used to explain peer influence is cultural transmission.²⁸⁹ This theory posits that all behavior is learned from the society or culture that surrounds a person, and that ideology, values and norms of behavior are “transmitted” from generation to generation.²⁹⁰ Though transmission is linear from top down, such as parent to child, behavior is not something that can be passed down biologically; it is something learned through experience and participation in society.²⁹¹ Cultural transmission theory has been used to explain the transmission of delinquency from generation to generation.

1. The Hardaway Brothers

In terms of group membership, having a family member as part of a group greatly increases the probability of an individual being a member also.²⁹² A study by the National Gang Crime Research Center determined that most gang members had family members already in a gang.²⁹³ Take the case of Derek Hardaway. On September 1, 1994, Derrick was just 14 years old when he drove his brother, Cragg, away from the scene of a

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ “Cultural Transmission,” Boundless Sociology, July 14, 2015, <https://www.boundless.com/sociology/textbooks/boundless-sociology-textbook/education-13/the-functionalist-perspective-on-education-100/cultural-transmission-562-9625/>.

²⁹⁰ Alberto Bisin and Thierry Verdier, “Cultural Transmission,” in *New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*, 2nd Edition, ed. L.J. Alston (London: Palgrave Macmillian Ltd, 2008), 1–9; Jelmer W. Eerkens and Carl P. Lipo, “Cultural Transmission Theory and the Archaeological Record: Providing Context to Understanding Variation and Temporal Changes in Material Culture,” *Journal of Archeological Research* 15 (2007), doi: 10.1007/s10814-007-9013-z, 239–274.

²⁹¹ Eerkens and Lip, “Cultural Transmission Theory,” 1–9; Boundless, “Cultural Transmission.”

²⁹² Keren Brooking, Ben Gardiner, and Sarah Calvert, *Backround of Students in Alternative Education: Interviews with a Selected 2008 Cohort* (Research, New Zealand: Ministry of Education, 2009).

²⁹³ Amanda Vogt, “Gangs: A Cry For Family?” *Chicago Tribune*, December 24, 1996, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-12-24/features/9612240065_1_gang-members-kids-probation-officer.

Chicago murder and was subsequently arrested.²⁹⁴ Cragg was 16 years when he shot Robert “Yummy” Sandifer, who himself was only 11 years old.

Derrick and Cragg Hardaway were close brothers who were both active members of the notorious Black Disciple street gang.²⁹⁵ Cragg was first to join, at the age of 12, with Derrick following closely behind him two years later. At first, Cragg peddled crack cocaine for the gang, but later his allegiance to the gang would transform him and his brother into murderers.²⁹⁶ Derrick, at the age of 12, idolized his brother and wanted to be a gang member like him. He thought the gang would give him “nice cars, money, women...and name recognition,” like his brother.²⁹⁷

Their victim, Yummy, was an 11-year-old member of the same gang who had a long juvenile arrest record.²⁹⁸ Yummy had shot and killed a 14-year-old girl named Shavon Dean mistakenly in August 1994. This caused a huge media uproar in the Chicago.²⁹⁹ The Black Disciples, disgusted with the negative attention, decided to have Yummy executed. They chose Cragg and Derrick to be the assassins. They lured Yummy to a dark underpass along a remote viaduct in downtown Chicago, where Cragg shot Yummy in the back of the head three times, killing him instantly. Derrick, who acted as the lookout and the getaway driver, recounts why he helped his brother:

I knew what was going to happen but there was nothing I could do...This is my blood [Cragg]. It was either Robert [Yummy]...or him.³⁰⁰

Derrick’s experience is all too common among kids joining gangs in an attempt to emulate an older sibling, parent or other family member.³⁰¹

²⁹⁴ Amanda Cohen, “Locked Up at 14 for an Infamous Murder, Living with Regrets,” Pantagraph, December 17, 2007, http://www.pantagraph.com/news/locked-up-at-for-an-infamous-murder-living-with-regrets/article_46eb3562-4204-57aa-8462-dbf8e58d3.html.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

³⁰¹ Brooking, Gardiner, and Calvert, *Background of Students*.

2. The Tsarnev Brothers

Another pair of brothers, Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnev, were convicted of planting explosives at the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013. The blast killed three people and injured over 250 others.³⁰² Both brothers had been radicalized to commit acts of terror against the American people through the teachings of Anwar al-Awlaki and other senior Al-Qaida leaders. They wanted to punish America in retaliation for what they believed was poor treatment of Muslims, which would allow them to become “mujahedeen.”³⁰³

Tamerlan was killed by authorities shortly after the attack and Dzhokhar was arrested and sentenced to death for using weapons of mass destruction³⁰⁴ During trial, lead defense attorney Judy Clarke acknowledged Dzhokhar’s guilt, but believed he should not face the death penalty because he was merely following his brother, Tamerlan.³⁰⁵ The defense claimed Tamerlan held considerable influence over Dzhokhar and that peer pressure was the true reason behind him assisting in the attack.³⁰⁶ Dzhokhar’s tragedy, much like Derrick Hardaway’s, began with familial peer pressure. But how?

The Tsarnev family immigrated to the United States from Russia in 2002, as refugees. Eventually, Dzhokhar resided with his brother, Tamerlan, and their parents, Anzor and Zubeidat, in Cambridge, Massachusetts.³⁰⁷ Dzhokhar attended the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth, where fellow students described him as popular and rather “normal” person.³⁰⁸ He liked to smoke marijuana, listen to hip-hop and seldom

³⁰² Ann O’Neill, “Tsarnaev Guilty of All 30 Counts in Boston Bombing,” CNN, April 8, 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/08/us/boston-marathon-bombing-trial/index.html>.

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Barney Henderson, “Boston Marathon Bombs: Suspect Captured—April 20 as it Happened,” *Telegraph*, April 20, 2013. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/>.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

talked about politics, least of all jihad.³⁰⁹ According to *The Economist*, he seemed “to have been much more concerned with sports and cheeseburgers than with religion, at least judging by his Twitter-feed.”³¹⁰ So what could turn an ordinary young man into a terrorist? According to John Curran, Tamerlan’s boxing coach, Dzhokhar used to follow his brother around “like a puppy dog,” which exposed the younger brother to the older brother’s extremist ideology.³¹¹

Unlike Dzhokhar, his brother Tamerlan was a devout Muslim who belonged to the Islamic Society of Boston Mosque near their home in Cambridge.³¹² According to Americans for Peace and Tolerance, an interfaith group that investigates Islamic mosques, the Islamic Society of Boston Mosque “teaches a brand of Islamic thought that encourages grievances against the West, distrust of law enforcement and opposition to Western forms of government, dress and social values.”³¹³ Several people who attended the mosque have been investigated for terrorism, including Abdulrahman Alamoudi, the mosque’s first president, who was convicted in a terrorist plot to assassinate a Saudi prince.³¹⁴

In 2011, Russia’s Federal Security Service warned the FBI that Tamerlan was a violent Islamic extremist looking to immigrate to Russia and join a terrorist group.³¹⁵ Although the FBI investigated and surveilled Tamerlan for a short time, they found no evidence of terrorist activity.³¹⁶ However, he was entered into the CIA’s Terrorist

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ “After the Marathon Bombing: Terrible Swift Sword,” *Economist*, April 27, 2013, <http://www.economist.com/>.

³¹¹ Jon Schuppe, “Brothers’ Classic Immigrant Tale Emerges as relatives Speak Out,” NBC, July 1, 2013, <http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/national-international/Boston-Bombing-Suspects-are-Russian-Brothers-Officials-Say-203757531.html>.

³¹² Oren Dorell, “Mosque that Boston Suspects Attended has Radical Ties,” *USA Today*, April 25, 2013. <http://www.usatoday.com/>.

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ “FBI Got Information from Russian FSB that Tamerlan Tsarnaev was Radical Islam Follower,” *Washington Post*, April 20, 2013, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/>.

³¹⁶ Ibid.

Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) database, used for identifying suspected terrorists.³¹⁷

But if cultural transmission theory can be used to explain the peer pressure exuberated by family, what about schoolmates, neighbors or others that don't reside in the household?

C. DIFFERENTIAL ASSOCIATION THEORY

The theory of differential association was developed in the 1970s by Edwin Sutherland to explain why people commit crimes.³¹⁸ Sutherland suggests criminal behavior is learned through various forms of association, interaction and communication amongst intimate personal groups.³¹⁹ These groups do not necessarily have to be part of one's family or reside in the same household—they can be anyone with whom a person has an intimate relationship. Delinquency, however, is not merely acquired through contact with other delinquents; it is also acquired through exposure to attitudes that support delinquency.³²⁰ Together, supportive attitudes and delinquent peers reinforce beliefs, attitudes and values that perpetuate criminal behavior.³²¹

Differential association theory can be used to explain more than just petty delinquency. Since crime is understood to be a learned behavior, this theory can apply to other forms of criminal behavior, such as white-collar crime or even terrorism.³²² In 2008, a New Zealand research project by Doctors Keren Brooking, Ben Gardiner and Sarah Clavert investigated gang affiliations.³²³ Based upon interviews of active and former gang members, they concluded that having friends in gangs was the greatest factor

³¹⁷ Bill Chappell, "Tamerlan Tsarnaev Spoke of Jihad with Mother, Reports Say," NPR, April 28, 2013, <http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/04/28/179611079/tamerlan-tsarnaev-spoke-of-jihad-with-mother-reports-say>.

³¹⁸ Shelden, Tracy, and Brown, *Youth Gangs in American Society*, 194.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ Ibid.

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² William O'Grady, *Crime in Canadian Context: Debate and Controversies*, 2nd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

³²³ Brooking, Gardiner, and Calvert, *Backround of Students*.

that influenced them to join.³²⁴ Sam, a “Young Eastsider” gang member describes why he joined his gang:

When I was first attracted to these friends in gangs I was at Intermediate (School). Then the crowd I was hanging around with at secondary school got into smoking drugs, gangs-I didn’t really care about education at the time. I had a mind set about who gives a shit, sorry, care about this and that. My identity, I didn’t know who I was really, and I thought smoking drugs made me feel cool and it calmed me down...There was this gang of Young Eastsiders and we used to hang around with them and then they started getting us into smoking dope-we used to look up to them.³²⁵

1. Tewhan “Massacre” Butler and Amorzi bin Nurhasyim

Another example of differential association is seen in the case of Tewhan Butler, also known as “Massacre”—a 34-year-old member of the notorious Blood (Double ii/QSBG) gang. He is currently incarcerated in federal prison for drug offenses and is serving an eleven-year sentence. When Massacre was asked why he joined a gang, he replied:

The question sort of threw me, though it is a question that one may figure I get asked often...My environment sort of shaped my thoughts, and left me thinking that much right was wrong. And if I wasn’t doing wrong, then there was no way I could be right...My time, effort, and energy went toward the streets and what I thought I knew of them. I’ll admit I was young; but I wanted was what I wanted. Knowing better did not always mean doing better. What I wanted to do was whatever my homeboys were doing. To me that meant loyalty...Loyalty is why I joined the gang. Loyalty to my people.³²⁶

Peer pressure and recruitment from friends is not indicative to street gangs but applies to terrorist organizations as well. McCauley writes:

As with criminal gangs, individuals are recruited to a terrorist group via personal connections with existing members. No terrorist wants to try to recruit someone who might betray the terrorist to authorities. In practice, this means recruiting from the network of friends, lovers, and family. Trust may determine the network within which radicals and terrorists

³²⁴ Ibid

³²⁵ Ibid.

³²⁶ Tewhan Butler, “Why Did I Join a Gang?” Live From Lockdown., Accessed July 15, 2015, <http://www.livefromlockdown.com/why-did-i-join-a-gang/>.

recruit, but love often determines who will join...There is widespread agreement amongst researchers that ‘most terrorists...ultimately became members of the terrorist organization through personal connections with people or relatives associated with appropriate political initiatives, communes, self-supporting organizations, or committees—the number of couples and brothers and sisters was astonishingly high.’³²⁷

Amrozi bin Nurhasyim was a 40-year-old male convicted of the October 22, 2002 bombing of two nightclubs in Bali.³²⁸ He was nicknamed the “Smiling Terrorist” because he smiled in front of media crews after his arrest.³²⁹ Amorzi was introduced to radical extremism through his brother, Mas Muklas.³³⁰ Amorzi stated: “It was Mas Muklas who raised my awareness to fight the injustice toward Islam.”³³¹

2. The Madrid Bombers

Another example of differential association in terrorism is the Madrid Bombers. On March 11, 2004, a group of young Islamic terrorists conducted a series of coordinated attacks in the subway system in Madrid, Spain. The attacks killed 191 people and injured an additional 2,050.³³² Hundreds of suspects were investigated, but in the end only 29 people were charged; of those 29, only 6 were charged with murder.³³³

The Madrid terrorists were primarily composed of first-generation North African Muslims, approximately 30 years old or younger.³³⁴ Some were illegal narcotic peddlers, part-time workers and university students. One such terrorist was a Moroccan immigrant named Jamal Ahmidan, who began selling drugs with two other terrorists, brothers

³²⁷ Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

³²⁸ Jarrett Murphy, “‘Smiling Terrorist’ Goes on Trial,” CBS, August 7, 2003, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/smiling-terrorist-goes-on-trial/>.

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ McCauley and Moskalenko, *Friction*.

³³¹ Ibid., 57.

³³² Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt. *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat* (New York: NYPD, 2007), 23–25.

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ Ibid.

Mohammed and Rachid Ouland Akcha.³³⁵ Another member was Basel Ghayoun from Syria, roommate of fellow co-conspirator Anghar Foud el Morabit from Algeria.³³⁶ In terms of peer networks, two were brothers and another two were schoolmates. Basel Ghayoun and Anghar Foud el Morabit (schoolmates) met when they both joined a group led by Salafi Wahhabis Rabei Osman el Sayed Ahmed, more commonly known as “Mohamed the Egyptian.”³³⁷ The two were not brought together to commit an attack, but, through their shared religion, radicalized together.³³⁸ It was their learned behavior from el Sayed Ahmed that led them to participate in the bombing.

D. CHAPTER SUMMARY

Peer networks and pressure are the strongest predictors of group membership street gangs and terrorist organizations. The influence of peer behavior is stronger in collectivist societies such as the Middle East, where there is greater interdependency amongst people. Cultural transmission through peer networks (especially family), occurs similarly in both street gangs and terrorist organizations. To account for those without family ties or from different cultures, differential association theory posits delinquency is learned from other delinquents, such as schoolmates, neighbors or friends.

As prevention and intervention programs for radicalizing terrorists begin to take shape, the effects of peer networks and pressure should be investigated.

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ Silber and Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*, 32.

³³⁸ Ibid.

VI. MAIN IMPLICATIONS

Most people do not join street gangs or terrorist organizations.³³⁹ Broad-based national or international gang and terrorist prevention programs are unlikely to capture those most in need.³⁴⁰ Intervention and prevention programs, therefore, must be based on local assessments and positioned in areas where there is a high rate of group membership. Programs based on local needs can be more intimately tailored to the members in the community who are most susceptible to join a street gang or terrorist organization.³⁴¹ But how can a community develop a counter-terrorism program identifying high-risk individuals? What makes these high-risk individuals different from other similarly situated people in the community? For answers, we turn to the study of gangs.

Much gang research conducted by criminologists is based on community assessments. Though some argue against comparing street gangs and terrorist organizations, this thesis shows many connections between what motivates individuals to join both groups. When people feel they are marginalized, discriminated against and powerless to bring about change, they turn to the only tool they have available: violence. This tool can be found in both street gangs and terrorist organizations. Because much gang research has already developed prevention and intervention programs, current gang knowledge can provide guidelines for developing counter-terrorism policies.

The goal of this research was to determine if terrorists and street gang members possess the same motivators. To do so, the research focused on descriptions of events told by the individuals themselves: the street gang members and the terrorists. To compare their motivations, four individual characteristics were selected: identity, poverty, progression and peer influence. These four characteristics have been studied and understood as motivators for group membership.

³³⁹ Klein and Maxson, *Street Gang: Patterns and Policies*, 67.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

A. IDENTITY

Identity is a compilation of characteristics that sets individuals apart from others, and changes over time and exposure.³⁴² According to psychoanalyst Erik Erikson, identity develops along a series of eight life stages, with each stage presenting a conflict the person must resolve before continuing identity development.³⁴³ Of particular importance uncovered in the research was Erikson's fifth stage of development, identity achievement versus role confusion. In this stage, the individual is attempting to figure out what kind of person he or she is, and the role he or she plays in society. If a person cannot find an identity or is unhappy with society's prescribed identity, he or she is said to have an identity crisis. A person stuck in an identity crisis will try and resolve the conflict. This can be accomplished in several ways. The person can identify with a particular group and accept its identity—he or she can “foreclose” on this constructed identity and choose not to explore different roles. The person can also adopt an identity that is easily attainable, or one that is seen as the only option. This “only option,” of course, sometimes lands on the identity of a street gang member or a terrorist.

Social identity theory postulates that a person's identity is conceived in part through his or her membership in a particular group. Once the individual places himself into that group through a process of self-categorization, he begins to see himself as similar to the other group members, and so starts behaving like them.³⁴⁴ A person's self-esteem also becomes tied to the group's status and they begin to compare their group to other groups.³⁴⁵ If they do not feel better off, they may become dissatisfied with their in-group and seek to leave.

Groups, therefore, must provide their members with a positive distinctiveness to retain and recruit members, as was the case with members of the Amal Movement who saw members of Hezbollah with a better military and regional standing—in an effort to

³⁴² Brannan, Darken and Strindberg, *A Practitioner's Way Forward*, 66.

³⁴³ Durrheim, YouTube video.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

increase their self-esteem and status, they left the Amal Movement group and re-joined with Hezbollah.³⁴⁶

SIT and the group dynamic it describes provides a tool for CVE policy makers and practitioners for developing intervention and prevention strategies. Though individuals join groups based on shared similarities, they will also leave a group if the group deflates their self-esteem. Herein lies a strategy for preventing high-risk individuals from joining a group, or from leaving. Policy that creates socially accepted groups that provide a positive distinctiveness may prove successful. Policy designed at diminishing a group's reputation may convince members to leave a group as well.

B. POVERTY

Relative deprivation theory explains that a frustrated person—impoverished in some fashion—may engage in behavior in an effort to better his or her situation.³⁴⁷ Strain theory further explains how this frustration can develop for people in relation to society.³⁴⁸ For Merton, each culture, each society sets goals for its members. People are under “strain” to accomplish these goals and can become frustrated when they cannot; people will then engage in specific behavior in order to alleviate that strain.³⁴⁹ The culture and/or society may have socially accepted ways to alleviate that strain, and people can conform, innovate or rebel from those ways.³⁵⁰ If a person believes his path to obtain a goal is blocked or unattainable, he will seek out mechanisms to overcome the obstacles; if a gang or terrorist group presents itself as just such a mechanism, the individual may join.³⁵¹ Sanchez-Jankowski believed a defiant individual will become involved in any behavior to make money, legal or illegal, and will resist any attempt to stop him.³⁵² This

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ Mogaddam, *From the Terrorists' Point of View*, 162–163.

³⁴⁸ Shelden, Tracy, and Brown. *Youth Gangs in American Society*, 183–184.

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

³⁵⁰ “6.2 Merton Strain Theory,” YouTube video.

³⁵¹ Shelden, Tracy, and Brown, *Youth Gangs in American Society*, 188.

³⁵² Sanchez-Jankowski, *Island in the Street*, 26.

makes street gangs enticing because they are known as unconventional businesses that provide members with illicit employment.³⁵³

Street gangs exist in impoverished parts of cities that suffer from social disorganization; they have weak governance, poor schooling, high unemployment and corruption.³⁵⁴ Social disorganization theory argues that higher rates of delinquency correlate to higher levels of social disorganization, as was seen with terrorist Johnny “Mad Dog” Adair—when the area around him began to deteriorate, he began offending. Some socially disorganized places in the Middle East, like Iraq, have seen the emergence of terror groups such as ISIS.³⁵⁵ Because these impoverished areas lack resources, residents must compete for them, and they often do so by banding together.³⁵⁶ When social institutions are unable to provide adequate resources for residents, street gangs and terrorist organizations can obtain those resources, providing an advantage for their members.

The development of counter-terrorism programs should assess the needs of local residents in order to design realistic, attainable ways in which residents can have their needs met. CVE intervention programs need to include stakeholders in the community, such as school principals, local business owners and clergy, who can work together to serve as an alternative mechanism to street gangs or terrorist organizations.

C. PROGRESSION

The progression from ordinary citizen to terrorist or gang member can happen rapidly or occur over years, incrementally leading to a terrorist act. CVE policies should seek to identify someone who is on a trajectory to join a street gang or terrorist group before it is too late. The frustration that Middle Eastern youths feel during “waithood” has led some to join terrorist groups like al Shabab, which capitalize on those feelings of

³⁵³ Sanchez-Jankowski, “Gangs and Social Change,” 202.

³⁵⁴ Hagedorn, “The Global Impact of Gangs,” 153–169; Shelden, Tracy, and Brown, *Youth Gangs in American Society*, 180.

³⁵⁵ Khedery, *The Guardian*.

³⁵⁶ Sanchez-Jankowski, “Gangs and Social Change,” 201.

frustration and offer an alternative path to progression.³⁵⁷ These feelings of stagnation are not only occurring in the Middle East; frustrated young adults in the United States have also felt the pain of graduating from school only to be unemployed. Some join gangs because of this stagnation.³⁵⁸

According to Moghaddam, only a small number of people will actually climb the “staircase,” and go on to commit a terrorist act.³⁵⁹ O’Dean describes a similarly staged scenario for potential street gang members.³⁶⁰ For an intervention program to be useful, it should occur before key transitional stages on individuals’ trajectory into a street gang or terrorist group.

D. PEER INFLUENCE

One of the most consistent predictors of group membership is the influence of peers.³⁶¹ Peer pressure can be positive or negative, and can exist in varying degrees among different societies. Peer pressure is stronger in collectivist, interdependent societies like those in the Middle East.³⁶² In individualistic societies like the United States, however, people are more autonomous and act more freely, and are therefore less likely to fall victim to pressure from groups.³⁶³

Cultural transmission explains how ideologies, values and norms are transmitted from generation to the next.³⁶⁴ Having a family member in a group greatly increases the likelihood of person belonging to the same group.³⁶⁵ Gang member Derrick Hardaway followed his older brother Cragg into the gang; the Boston Marathon bomber terrorists, Tamerlan and Dzhokar Tsarnev, were brothers; and Dzhokar followed his older brother

³⁵⁷ Ali, *The Link Between Unemployment and Terrorism*.

³⁵⁸ San Diego Deputy Sheriffs’ Association, *Gang, Groups, Cults*.

³⁵⁹ Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism,” 162–163.

³⁶⁰ O’Dean, *Gang Injunctions and Abatement*, 17.

³⁶¹ Klein and Maxson, *Street Gang: Patterns and Policies*, 146.

³⁶² Forsyth, *Group Dynamics*, 67–69.

³⁶³ Ibid.

³⁶⁴ Eerkens and Lipo, “Cultural Transmission Theory,” 239–274.

³⁶⁵ Brooking, Gardiner, and Calvert, *Backround of Students*.

Tamerlan into radicalization.³⁶⁶ Differential association also explains that criminal behavior is learned through various forms of association, interaction, and communication among intimate personal groups, whether family members, friends, or other community members.³⁶⁷ Since delinquency and crime are understood to be learned behaviors, like any other behavior, this theory can be applicable to other forms of criminal behavior such as terrorism.³⁶⁸

Once a radicalized person or terrorist is identified, CVE program developers should look to the individuals peer network for future program clients.

³⁶⁶ Vogt, “Gangs: A Cry For Family?”

³⁶⁷ Sheldon, Tracy, and Brown, *Youth Gangs in American Society*, 194.

³⁶⁸ O’Grady, *Crime in Canadian Context*.

VII. POLICIES AND STRATEGIES

This research intended to illustrate the similarities between some foreign terrorists and domestic U.S. street gang members in order to guide policy makers and practitioners who are developing counter-terrorism and counter-violent extremism policy, strategy, and programs. Its overarching goal is to stem the growth of terrorist organizations through effective new policies. Rather than wasting resources researching, inventing and developing new theories, these policy makers can turn to the robust study of gangs for practical direction, and can then adopt a best-practice approach. This research would be incomplete if it did not touch on past gang prevention policies and programs.

The 2015 White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism advocates for a community-oriented approach to policy making.³⁶⁹ The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, more commonly referred to as the Spergel Model, is a program in use today to deal with gangs. It is a comprehensive, community-oriented approach that may serve as a model for future CVE programs.³⁷⁰

A. GANG PROGRAM SYNOPSIS

In 1987, the United States Department of Justice launched the Juvenile Gang Suppression and Intervention Research and Development Program, headed by Dr. Irving Spergel of the University of Chicago.³⁷¹ Research teams surveyed 254 various public and private agencies in 45 different cities across the country on their gang programs.³⁷² The program's goal was to identify the best practices of each program and determine an effective method in which to measure their success. Based upon the data collected, Spergel found common strategies in a preponderance of the programs that fit into four

³⁶⁹ Office of the Press Secretary, "The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism."

³⁷⁰ For more information on the Spergel Model, see Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, *Best Practices to Address Community Gang Problems* (Washington, DC: National Gang Center, 2010), 1.

³⁷¹ Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, *Best Practices to Address Community Gang Problems*, 1.

³⁷² Shelden, Tracy, and Brown, *Youth Gangs in American Society*, 231.

broad categories: community organization, social intervention, opportunity provision and suppression.³⁷³

Community organization involves local community leaders, community groups, business owners, local citizens and former gang members.³⁷⁴ When all these stakeholders cooperate, they can take advantage of the diverse skills, resources and knowledge to collectively solve a community's gang problem. This includes mobilizing the community, building community trust and education.³⁷⁵

Social interventions are the most common methods used to combat street gangs.³⁷⁶ They involve a collection of coordinated efforts among youth-based agencies, religious organizations and police who work in a community.³⁷⁷ These strategies include: crisis intervention, mentoring programs, dispute resolution between gangs, counseling and drug treatment programs.³⁷⁸

Opportunity provisions attempt to provide jobs, job training, education and job placement to at-risk youth. These types of strategies also include assisting in formal education.³⁷⁹

Suppression efforts are strictly a collection of law enforcement efforts. This includes police, prosecutors, prisons, parole, probation and specialized gang units.³⁸⁰ They also include monitoring gang members and at-risk youth.³⁸¹

³⁷³ Ibid., 234.

³⁷⁴ Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, *Best Practices*, 2.

³⁷⁵ Shelden, Tracy, and Brown, *Youth Gangs in American Society*, 234.

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

³⁷⁷ Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, *Best Practices*, 2.

³⁷⁸ Shelden, Tracy, and Brown, *Youth Gangs in American Society*, 234.

³⁷⁹ Ibid., 235.

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

³⁸¹ Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, *Best Practices*, 2.

B. MEASUREMENTS OF PROGRAM SUCCESS

One of Spergel's more difficult tasks was assessing a program's success. There are several commonly used measurements:

- Number of program clients
- Number of services a program can provide
- Increase in school attendance and performance by program clients
- Reduction in gang violence and criminal behavior
- Increase in parent-community involvement
- Increase in parent involvement in school
- Increase in community volunteerism
- Increase in and strength of community mobilization efforts³⁸²

These measurements, however, are wrought with problems. For example, the number of clients a program is able to service is not an adequate measure of success, since only a small portion of the youth population is at risk for joining a street gang, and even a smaller number actually join.³⁸³ Programs designed to accommodate a high number of clients will undoubtedly include likely non-joiners, which makes them unnecessarily costly and inefficient.³⁸⁴ Klein and Maxson write:

Number of clients served becomes the goal rather than numbers possibly affected, or client satisfaction replaces client change, or general youth services replace focused gang prevention activity.³⁸⁵

Klein and Maxson also describe the problem of "goal displacement."³⁸⁶ This is when program goals that are not easily achieved are replaced by goals more readily amenable to a measurement of success.³⁸⁷ Gang intervention programs have a history of

³⁸² "L.A. Bridges Program," The United States Conference of Mayors, September 1998, http://www.usmayors.org/bestpractices/bp98/09_1998_Preventing_School_Violence115.

³⁸³ Klein and Maxson, *Street Gang: Patterns and Policies*, 105.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

dissolving into non-gang programs e.g., after school tutoring programs.³⁸⁸ Such programs become fashioned upon an ability to measure something rather than effectiveness. Effectiveness is perhaps the most difficult measure because success can have many definitions. These measurements are so difficult to assess, in fact, that many programs shifted away from dissuading youths to join gangs, instead focusing energy on trying to measure how well the program was implemented.³⁸⁹ In other words, success is measured by how efficiently and economically the program was implemented rather than how effective it truly was.

At the crux of all these measurements is the ability to determine suitable program clients. Prevention programs need to identify those individuals most at risk for joining street gangs, which requires some form of early identification. Once program clients are identified, program resources can be swiftly and efficiently deployed.

Intervention programs are even more complex because the individuals are already in a gang, for which they have developed social bonds and allegiances. Intervention programs have had difficulty persuading gang members to leave a gang because most programs have not demonstrated more appealing advantages than staying in the gang.³⁹⁰ Intervention programs must illustrate a suitable alternative to being in a gang.

Suppression is the most common approach; though it is most easily measurable, it is the least effective approach. As Klein and Maxson reason, “Los Angeles County is said to have 85,000 gang members, a staggering figure. If we were to crack down on and put away these 85,000 gang individuals, within 10 years we’d have another 85,000 to put away.”³⁹¹ Governments and communities cannot arrest their way out of the street gang problem. Spergel’s research showed suppression programs ranked at the bottom of effective programs in reducing gang membership.³⁹² Yet despite this acknowledgement,

³⁸⁸ Ibid., 113.

³⁸⁹ Ibid., 105.

³⁹⁰ Ibid., 113.

³⁹¹ Ibid., 106.

³⁹² Shelden, Tracy, and Brown, *Youth Gangs in American Society*, 232–234.

the law enforcement approach in dealing with gangs is the most popular.³⁹³ The criminal justice system spends around \$150 billion dollars a year; this is up from \$11 billion in the 1970s, and this number will continue to grow due to the increase in securitization after 9/11.³⁹⁴

With the advent of statistical data the criminal justice system has to come to rely so heavily on, measurement can be reduced to a series of numbers. Thus, the manner in which those numbers increase or decrease becomes a demonstrable measurement of success. Spergel found suppression efforts through the criminal justice system only worked as short-term solutions. Although he believed short-term solutions were still needed, he argued that they must be coupled with longer-term policies. The recent dramatic increase in gang-related violence in Baltimore demonstrates this fact. When asked about the role law enforcement should play in stemming that violence, Baltimore Community Activist Munir Bahar stated:

People are focusing on enforcement, not preventing violence. Police enforce a code, a law. Our job as the community is to prevent the violence, and we've failed....We need anti-violence organizations, we need mentorship programs, we need a long-term solution. But we also need immediate relief. When we're in something so deep, we have to stop it before you can analyze what the root is.³⁹⁵

Bahar recognizes the community's need to provide long-term solutions to deal with gangs, but he also understands the need for law enforcement, if only as a short-term solution to stem the violence. Criminal justice efforts should be viewed as a stop gap to prevent immediate violence and criminal behavior, not as a long-term solution to reduce problems associated with gangs and terrorist groups.

³⁹³ Ibid.

³⁹⁴ Ibid.

³⁹⁵ "Baltimore Has Deadliest Month in 43 Years," *New York Post*.

C. THE SPERGEL MODEL: A COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY-WIDE APPROACH TO GANG PREVENTION

- Spergel was not just commissioned to study country-wide gang programs for best practices; he was also funded to develop a program of his own. He did so by synthesizing the best practices he and his team discovered during research. The result was the Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention. With this approach, Spergel offered a general community-oriented program design. It was the first attempt to a comprehensive approach that involved multiple stakeholders in the community.³⁹⁶ According to this model, future and current gang programs should contain the following elements: Programs should work to educate community stakeholders of their community's gang problem.
- Programs should effectively and collectively organize community stakeholders to combat gangs.
- Programs must set goals and objectives. They should be clearly delineated so stakeholders have a clear path to work toward completing them. These should also include short-term suppression efforts from law enforcement and longer-term strategies such as job training and placement.
- Programs should have relevant programming and justify approaches and services.
- Programs should address and seek to increase youth accountability.
- Programs must be adequately staffed with properly trained personnel.
- Practices must be thoroughly and constantly assessed to determine its effectiveness.
- Programs must be properly funded based on effectiveness.³⁹⁷

In 1993, Spergel rolled out the first version of his program in the Little Village section of Chicago.³⁹⁸ Without review or assessment to determine if the program was working, it spread to five other cities. It was not until mid-2002 that program evaluations began to trickle in. Based upon initial assessments, it was not a success. The main problem appeared to be the way the program was implemented in the cities. Other noted problems were:

³⁹⁶ Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, *Best Practices*, 2.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 2–4.

³⁹⁸ Klein and Maxson, *Street Gang: Patterns and Policies*, 118.

- The program was not adequately articulated in writing with clear goals
- The program did not adequately provide a method of implementation
- Some of the jurisdictions were not capable of handling the complexities of the program
- The program lacked a competent coordinator
- The program was not constantly monitored, evaluated and corrected³⁹⁹

D. THE WAY FORWARD

The Spergel Model was an attempt to combine prevention, intervention and suppression into one community-oriented program.⁴⁰⁰ It therefore makes an excellent model for those drafting new CVE policies. Those drafters, however, must be mindful of the Spergel program's failures. In addition to avoiding the identified pitfalls, they should adopt similar strategies the program successfully promoted to fight street gangs.⁴⁰¹ Those strategies should revolve around community participation, intervention, job training and placement, defined program focus for all stakeholders and short-term suppression options.

Long-term CVE strategies should include policies that can mobilize and involve members of the community, including public and private entities. Those strategies have to develop long-term relationships with these stakeholders that foster mutual cooperation in resolving the community's radical extremism problems. Each stakeholder must understand and be actively involved in its solution.

Intervention programs should begin by identifying those who are radicalizing. This research provides a starting point—once a person has been identified as a potential program client, intervention and outreach programs can be specifically aimed at de-radicalization. Individuals who have benefited from the program should also be used to further help others in need. These people can relate better to potential program clients and can illustrate a positive alternative to violent extremism.

³⁹⁹ Ibid., 119.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid., 120.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid., 121.

Developing opportunities for those progressing along the path of extremism may be difficult in the midst of sluggish economies. However, modern job training programs coupled with available placement may provide a healthy alternative to a terrorist group for those in stagnation. Job creation from private partners in the program is essential for providing these alternatives.

The community, furthermore, cannot expect to arrest its way out of violent extremism. Law enforcement, vigorous prosecutions and increasing correctional programs should only be used as short-term remedies to stop immediate threats from those already radicalized. Once radicalized individuals enter the criminal justice system, intervention and education programs must be available to rehabilitate them to non-criminal behavior.

Careful attention must be given to how the program is implemented. The program should:

- Be adequately defined with clear goals of countering violent extremism. It must also include how this is done.
- Identify those most in need of the services provided by the program.
- Be headed by a well-trained program leader who is able to successfully navigate the programs complexities and coordinate the stakeholders effectively.
- Have ongoing evaluation, assessment and accountability. It must measure its success and failure. It must also be agile and able to change once problems are encountered.
- Start off in test communities before being implemented to broader communities. Once successful foundational aspects of the program are realized they can then be mimicked in other areas.

Most importantly: None of the new CVE policies, strategies or programs will matter unless satisfactory program clients are identified. This research provided a better understanding of who these people are, and how they can be identified when they are at risk.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Post-9/11, much attention has been placed on securitization and law enforcement efforts as methods to suppress terrorist groups. Yet, despite this effort, people continue to join terrorist organizations at alarming rates. A longer-term strategy is needed if we are to prevent future attacks. One possible strategy is to prevent individuals from joining terrorist groups in the first place. If the federal government is looking for a comprehensive, community-oriented approach to deter citizens from joining violent groups, they can benefit from the study of domestic street gang recruitment.

To utilize this research effectively, the federal government must agree that street gangs and terrorist groups share similarities. This research explored the commonalities based on four key characteristics that influence people to join groups: identity deprivation, poverty, progression and peer pressure.

Identity is not something a person is born with, but rather something that is acquired and evolves throughout a person's life. It is the answer to the question, "What kind of person am I?" Erikson believed such a question must be answered before a person can be intimate with others and become a successful adult. Identity can develop and be obtained in a variety of ways, though one common way is through a process of self-categorization. A person places himself in a particular group that has people with whom he shares similar characteristics. Once a member, he adopts the identity, status and behavior of that group. Group members then start to compare themselves to members of other groups. If they are faring better, than they will stay; if they are faring worse, they may leave their group and join another.

CVE policy makers should capitalize on the significance of this group process. If policy makers wish to prevent people from joining a terrorist group or cause members to leave, they have to convince members that they would fare better if they were not a member of that group. The programs should help these individuals understand that terrorist groups have negative value and cause a diminished social status, which will make them unattractive to join or to stay in long term.

As this research also demonstrated, it is no coincidence that many gang members and terrorists had family members, schoolmates and/or close intimate friends in their respective groups prior to them joining. Once a street gang member or terrorist is identified, program workers should search their peer networks (including siblings, schoolmates and close intimate friends) for potential candidates for intervention and prevention programs. These networks exert a significant amount of influence concerning whether a person joins or avoids a group. Getting to a program client early, before the person can form cohesive social bonds to a terrorist group, is essential.

Culture and the structure of society are harder to change. Gangs thrive in communities with failing social and economic institutions principally because the communities are too weak to combat them. Gangs can also be found in impoverished communities where resources are scarce. Gangs become particularly attractive because they can provide their members access to resources they would otherwise be unable to obtain. CVE programs will have a hard time developing a remedy to failed social institutions. In sluggish economies, it is not always possible to find potential program clients employment. There also may not be adequate funding for job training and placement.

Ali believed entrepreneurship could be a successful remedy for CVE programs to combat failing social institutions. Teaching people to take charge of their economic destiny is a way to counter a dwindling job market. People, especially those stuck in “waithood,” should not simply wait for a job to come to them or pin their hopes on government assistance. Instead, they should go out into their communities and create their own opportunities. This can be accomplished by changing the way in which we train future generations. Entrepreneurship and support of emerging small business can be a way to accomplish this goal.

Changing how we view each other and the environments in which terrorist groups operate may seem like a lofty goal. But if we are to prevent future terrorist attacks, we must make longer-term efforts to stem their recruitment. The material covered in this research and the examples provided illustrate that there are similarities between street gang members and terrorists. If nothing else, it reminds us that gangs and terrorist

organizations are still groups of people. Prevention and intervention programs will fare better if they are fashioned from what is known about group processes and mentalities.

There is a long academic history in the study of gangs. That accumulated knowledge coupled with the experiences of successful and failed intervention programs should provide a solid starting point for countering violent extremist strategies. There is no need to develop brand new models or spend years developing a program from the ground up. The way forward is already there in the gang literature.

The study of street gangs may not provide all the answers, but, at the very least, it may show us what has not worked in the past, and guide future programs. In our endearing effort to stem the growth of gangs and terrorist organizations, this research concludes with a passage from Klein, Maxson and Miller:

There are few guidelines for success, only continuing approaches that “feel right,” those that conform to conventional wisdoms...The saddest message of all is simply this; little that has been done can be demonstrated to be useful. Thus, the clues for the future have less to do with what might work, than with avoiding in the future what has not worked.⁴⁰²

⁴⁰² Klein and Maxson, *Street Gang: Patterns and Policies*, 246.

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